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When Do Firms Highlight Their Effective Tax Rate? 
 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms’ financial statements 
as a distinct disclosure choice. Applying a game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure 
strategies of firms to a tax setting, we argue that firms face a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions. 
On the one hand, firms have an incentive to enhance their ETR disclosure when the ratio offers 
shareholders “favourable conditions”, for example in terms of higher expected after-tax cash-flows. On 
the other hand, the disclosure of a favourable low ETR could attract the attention of tax auditors and the 
public and ultimately result in disclosure costs. We empirically test disclosure behaviour by examining 
the relation between disclosure visibility and different ETR conditions that reflect different stakeholder-
specific costs and benefits. While we find that unfavourable ETR conditions are not highlighted, we 
observe higher disclosure visibility for favourable ETRs (smooth, close to the industry average, 
decreasing). Additional analyses reveal that this high visibility is characteristic of firm-years with only 
moderately decreasing ETRs at usual ETR levels, while extreme ETRs are not highlighted. Interestingly 
and in contrast to our main results, a subsample of family firms do not seem to highlight favourable 
ETRs.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Effective tax rate, Cost-benefit trade-off, Disclosure decision, Reputational costs, Tax 
disclosure 
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1. Introduction 
This study examines the visibility of the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) in firms’ financial statements, 
specifically in voluntary disclosures in firms’ annual reports. Intense media coverage of firms’ tax 
avoidance strategies has imposed tax-related reputational risks on firms and raised both firms’ and tax 
authorities’ sensitivity towards provided tax information. The conduct of global firms such as Starbucks 
and Google in this area has triggered public resentment towards firms that avoid taxes and exhibit low 
or zero ETR, even going so far as to result in “tax shaming” (Barford and Holt 2013). As a consequence, 
the disclosure of tax information in annual reports has become a strategic decision for firms depending 
on the ETR condition. Anecdotal evidence from interviews conducted in this study supports this 
observation:1 
“There is close coordination with the Investor Relations department as part of the regular exchange with the other 
parts of the finance function. This also includes the tax department reporting the outcome of the ETR and 
explaining deviations from the previous year to the finance function. Especially, it explains any special effects to 
the Investor Relations department.” 
Global Head of Taxes of a major German listed corporation 
 
Despite increased attention to corporate tax information, corporate tax disclosure habits remain under-
researched. Little is known about how firms communicate their tax information. Some studies indicate 
that firms fail to comply with tax disclosure requirements (Gleason and Mills 2002) or strategically 
avoid disclosing unpleasant tax information (Hope et al. 2013, Dyreng et al. 2016, Akamah et al. 2018). 
By contrast, to mitigate potential negative stakeholder reactions to uncertainty due to insufficient or 
unclear tax information, firms seem to report the respective items voluntarily (Bedard et al. 2010, 
Flagmeier and Müller 2017, Balakrishnan et al. 2019, Chen et al. 2019). Bruehne and Schanz (2018) 
provide interview-based insights into firms’ tax disclosure, indicating that firms engage in addressee-
specific external tax communication to reduce tax risk in the form of external pressure. Thus, firms face 
a trade-off in their ETR disclosure decisions when anticipating different stakeholder responses. Inger et 
al. (2018) examine this trade-off and provide evidence that the association between tax avoidance and 
the readability of the tax footnote depends on the level of tax avoidance, consistent with firms sometimes 
explaining and sometimes concealing tax avoidance. Against this background, it is interesting to further 
explore how firms voluntarily disclose ETR information. 
With this study, we contribute to this emerging literature and analyse firms’ tax disclosure behaviour 
with respect to one of the most prominent tax metrics, the ETR, which at the same time is an important 
signal to stakeholders. We build on the game-theory disclosure model for voluntary disclosure strategies 
in Wagenhofer (1990) and exploit the mechanism for examining the trade-off that we expect to shape 
ETR disclosures. On the one hand, firms wish to disclose favourable information (i.e., a favourable ETR 
to investors) as visibly as possible to trigger positive market reactions. As tax payments represent 
substantial costs for a firm, managers usually prefer to communicate a decreasing or low ETR (e.g., 
 
1
  See Appendix A for details on anecdotal evidence from our interviews.  
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compared to the statutory tax rate) to fuel positive capital market reactions, as indicated by prior studies 
on tax avoidance in general (e.g., Frischmann et al. 2008, Desai and Dharmapala 2009, Koester 2011) 
and low ETRs in particular (e.g., Lev and Thiagarajan 1993, Swenson 1999).2  
On the other hand, the same information (e.g., disclosing a low or decreasing ETR) can cause adverse 
actions from stakeholders. The response of politicians, public organizations, NGOs, or a group of 
investors that is particularly devoted to good corporate citizenship reflected in a sufficiently high ETR 
can give rise to costs for the firm. Disclosing low ETRs attracts the attention of tax auditors (Bozanic et 
al. 2017). This can ultimately result in additional tax payments after more stringent tax audits (Hanlon 
et al. 2017, Dyreng et al. 2019), or trigger reputational costs as a result of public scrutiny. One group of 
stakeholders may primarily target after-tax cash-flows and thus appreciate low ETRs, while another 
could be especially sensitive to the societal role of the firm, which makes them more inclined to side 
with the tax authorities and express concern about too-low tax rates. When exposed to conflicting 
interests of shareholders and external stakeholders, we expect firms’ ETR condition to influence their 
decision on how to disclose this fundamental tax information.  
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS)3 define the ETR as “the tax expense (income) 
divided by the accounting profit” (IAS 12.86). While there is no requirement to disclose the ETR itself, 
the two components of the ETR, total tax expense and pre-tax income, must be disclosed and the relation 
between the two has to be explained (IAS 12.81 (c)). Hence, an interested financial statement reader is 
always able to search and find or calculate the ETR from mandatory financial statement disclosures. By 
contrast, a (less knowledgeable or inattentive) reader who is not explicitly looking for ETR information 
may not notice the ETR if disclosed in a non-prominent section of the financial statements, e.g., in the 
tax footnotes. In a similar vein, interview responses in Bruehne and Schanz (2018, p. 27) suggest that 
“the information that is shared with the public has to be selected carefully, due to the low literacy of the 
general public and the polarizing effect of tax topics”. Against this background, it is likely that firms 
strategically manage ETR visibility. As prior studies document that annual reports have increased in 
length over the past decade (Li 2008), with practitioners arguing that this disclosure overload makes it 
difficult to process the flood of information (Radin 2007), visibility can be increased by disclosing the 
information early in the annual report. Hence, we measure disclosure visibility using two different 
variables, hand-collected from firms’ annual reports: first, whether the ETR is mentioned in a 
 
2
  Positive capital market reactions mainly apply to non-aggressive tax avoidance. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) 
observe negative stock price reactions to news about a company’s involvement in a tax shelter. However, 
Gallemore et al. (2014) find that negative capital market reactions to news of aggressive tax avoidance reverse 
soon after.  
3
  We use the acronym “IFRS” to refer to all standards issued by the International Accounting Standards Board 
(IASB) and the predecessor International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC), including IFRS and 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). Firms listed on an EU-regulated market have to adopt IFRS for their 
consolidated statements for fiscal years beginning January 1, 2005 (EC Regulation No. 1606/2002). 
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management report and second, the number of the page on which the ETR is first mentioned. Both 
measures indicate how much attention a firm wants to draw to the ETR.  
To provide insights into the disclosure trade-off, we test three categories of ETR conditions for which 
we expect different stakeholder-specific implications. Figure 1 provides an overview of the categories. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
Categories 1 and 2 comprise ETR conditions which are favourable from a shareholder-oriented 
perspective. Category 1 abstracts from concerns of other stakeholders and can be proxied by the 
conditions “smooth ETRs” (McGuire et al. 2013, Demeré et al. 2019) and “ETRs close to the industry 
average” (Hoopes et al. 2017, Inger et al. 2018, Armstrong et al. 2019). Shareholders as well as other 
stakeholders generally prefer predictable ETRs and ETRs in a “reasonable” range. Our anecdotal 
evidence further supports the preference for smooth ETRs: 
“The target rate is 25%. It is also important to us that the ETR does not fluctuate.”  
Global Head of Taxes of a major German listed corporation 
Hence, the benefits of such non-surprising and persistent ETRs are expected to outweigh the potential 
costs of signalling a tax planning strategy that obviously is not aiming at exploiting all tax-saving 
opportunities and generating low ETRs. We therefore expect firms to highlight the ETR if it is smooth 
or close to the peer benchmark. Category 1 disclosures are deemed to reflect the disclosure choice of 
firms that deliberately draw attention to the their ETR to benefit from appreciative capital market 
responses. Category 2 includes ETR conditions which are favourable from a shareholder-oriented 
perspective at first glance but may elicit adverse actions from other stakeholders (public scrutiny, tax 
auditors). Our proxy for Category 2 is “decreasing ETR”. A decreasing ETR results in higher after-tax 
income, the preferred outcome from a pure shareholder perspective (Graham et al. 2011). At the same 
time, a decreasing ETR raises concerns about good corporate citizenship, which can be costly for the 
firm. We focus on decreasing ETRs rather than ETR levels, because a change also sends out a new 
signal to all groups of stakeholders. In an additional analysis we examine whether the previous ETR 
level or the magnitude of the decrease matter. Decreasing ETR is our main category as it best reflects 
the conflicting interests of different stakeholder groups and thus fully reflects the tension involved in 
disclosure choice. Last, in Category 3, we examine ETR conditions which are unfavourable from a 
shareholder perspective and at the same time have unclear implications for other stakeholders. This 
category includes conditions such as “volatile ETRs”, “increasing ETRs”, and “ETRs well above the 
industry average”. While these conditions presumably involve considerable costs for shareholders, the 
benefits for other stakeholders are unclear. Hence, we expect a decrease in disclosure visibility under 
Category 3 ETR conditions.  
We examine a sample of German DAX30 and MDAX firms from 2005 to 2018. Analysing the largest 
German firms with respect to market capitalization and order book volumes ensures that our sample 
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firms attract much public interest and can therefore rationally expect disclosure costs from reactions of 
other stakeholders. Despite these large firms being constantly under intense scrutiny from tax 
authorities, anecdotal evidence from interviews with tax managers suggests that tax auditor scepticism 
may increase with decreasing ETRs.  
“Reputation is definitely seen as a topic. For us, it is important not to plan aggressively, otherwise you will quickly 
be in the focus of NGOs. This also influences CSR reporting and the climate of a tax audit.” 
Global Head of Taxes of a major German listed corporation 
 
In our multivariate tests, we find a positive and highly significant association between disclosure 
visibility and the ETR conditions that should not raise major concerns among external stakeholders 
(Category 1). The probability of ETR disclosure in the management report increases and the ETR is on 
average disclosed earlier in the report if it is smooth or close to the average industry ETR. This finding 
is most intuitive and corroborates our assumption that the ETR is highlighted provided the condition is 
beneficial for shareholders and does not elicit costly reactions from other stakeholders. The results for 
decreasing ETRs shed light on the trade-off that firms face in the disclosure decision (Category 2). We 
find significantly higher disclosure visibility in the case of decreasing ETRs, indicating that shareholder 
benefits outweigh costs and firms give greater visibility to decreasing ETRs. Consistent with this notion, 
the results for our third category reflect the opposite: volatile and increasing ETRs are on average less 
likely to be mentioned in the management report and are disclosed on a later page. We do not find 
significant results for ETRs that are well above the industry benchmark. The results for Category 3 
suggest that for volatile and increasing ETRs, the disclosure costs outweigh the benefits.  
In several cross-sectional tests, we provide further insights into firms’ disclosure decisions. 
Interestingly, our results suggest that the observed disclosure behaviour seems to be partly reversed for 
German listed family firms, i.e., for firms controlled by a family. In other words, instead of increasing 
disclosure visibility in the case of favourable ETRs, family firms disclose the ETR on a later page when 
it is favourable from a shareholder perspective but on an earlier page when it is volatile or increasing. 
This is in line with prior literature (e.g., Chen et al. 2008) and our anecdotal evidence, suggesting that 
family firms are subject to different cost benefit trade-offs and pay special attention to the ETR when it 
deviates from the norm and requires additional explanation.  
“Our tax planning is designed so that we cannot come into focus. … We explain tax issues that we expect could 
be misinterpreted by the broader public.” 
Global Head of Taxes of a major German family corporation 
We do not find systematic differences in disclosure behaviour when we divide our sample firms into 
more and less consumer-oriented firms. In additional analyses of our main category of decreasing ETRs, 
we examine declines in different ETR levels and different magnitudes and find that only moderate 
decreases (between zero and five ETR percentage points) and from conventional levels (ETR level 
between 25 and 50 per cent) are highlighted. For very large declines (more than 20 ETR percentage 
points), the relation with disclosure visibility is even reversed. 
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Our study contributes to three streams of literature. First, we contribute to the literature on voluntary tax 
disclosure and its determinants. We focus on ETR disclosures as a measure to convey tax information 
condensed in a single ratio that is not distracted by information complexity (Plumlee 2003, Bratten et 
al. 2017). Consistently, our results suggest that the visibility of ETR disclosure in annual reports varies 
with the condition of the ETR. Our study corroborates the findings of Inger et al. (2018) who examine 
the association of tax footnote readability and tax avoidance. We extend their work in three ways: we 
document the relevance of several ETR conditions for disclosure behaviour, in particular decreasing, 
smooth, close to industry average, and volatile ETRs. Accounting for different stakeholder incentives 
in firms’ disclosure choice, we link our research to Wagenhofer (1990) and Armstrong et al. (2015). 
Moreover, our findings indicate a reverse relation for family firms, providing evidence of cross-sectional 
differences in disclosure behaviour. Specifically, we shed light on the impact of firm characteristics and 
multi-faceted stakeholder groups. Furthermore, our additional tests suggest that not only the level of the 
ETR matters for the disclosure behaviour but also the degree of the ETR change. This is consistent with 
shareholders preferring non-aggressive or even socially responsible forms of tax avoidance (Hanlon and 
Slemrod 2009, Inger and Stekelberg 2020) and firms considering these preferences in their disclosure 
choices. Given that firms step up their disclosure despite intense media interest in tax-avoiding firms 
and possible resulting public pressure, our results can be interpreted as firms expecting considerable 
shareholder benefits from promoting, for example, decreasing yet conventional ETRs. In providing 
insights into firms’ disclosure incentives, we help explain variations observed in cross-company tax 
disclosure behaviour (e.g., Kvaal and Nobes 2013). 
Second, we contribute to the literature on the importance that firms assign to tax-related information. 
Graham et al. (2014) show that managers care about the ETR and that it is widely used as input when 
deciding on new corporate investments (Graham et al. 2017). Our results indicate that the importance 
of the ETR as a key performance indicator is also reflected in financial statement disclosure behaviour. 
Our finding that the ETR is disclosed in the management report (i.e., the section in which firms are 
expected to discuss the most relevant information) in 78 per cent of our observations highlights the 
importance that firms assign to the ETR.  
Third, our research adds a tax perspective and tax evidence to the broader accounting literature on 
voluntary (risk) disclosures (for an overview see Dye 2001, Beyer et al. 2010 and Bischof and Daske 
2013). Our findings corroborate interview-based evidence in Bruehne and Schanz (2018) on reducing 
reputational tax risks via strategic tax disclosure. To sum up, our findings outline how firms assess the 
cost-benefit trade-off of ETR visibility accounting for diverging stakeholder preferences.  
2. Hypothesis Development 
Analytical research on voluntary disclosure in accounting literature suggests that favourable information 
is disclosed while unfavourable information is withheld (Verrecchia 2001). Other streams of literature 
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indicate that incentives such as litigation risks can motivate managers to release negative news (e.g., 
Skinner 1994, Kasznik and Lev 1995) and that incentives such as costs can cause managers to withhold 
good news (Wagenhofer 1990). Specifically, Wagenhofer (1990) describes a setting in which a firm has 
private information from the firm’s information system. The information is exogenous. When this 
information is favourable and the firm decides to disclose it, the capital market reacts positively. We 
interpret ETRs as one such piece of information and reinterpret the modelled disclosure decision as a 
decision to highlight. We assume exogeneity of the ETR based on anecdotal evidence collected from 
practitioners (see Appendix A for details), uniformly pointing to the ETR disclosure decision following 
the ETR condition in a sequential process. Hence, while the ETR is not exogenous on the firm-level, it 
is exogenous within the firm for the department (typically Investor Relations) responsible for the 
disclosure behaviour. In the model, disclosing favourable information leads to adverse actions from an 
opponent (here: e.g., tax auditor, tax legislator, media). For instance, disclosures of low ETRs are 
generally perceived as favourable by shareholders. The opponent’s adverse action results in costs for 
the firm, e.g., harsher tax audits, increased regulation, or negative publicity, all of which affects the 
assessment of shareholders (Kubick et al. 2016, Bozanic et al. 2017). If the condition of the ETR is 
generally perceived as unfavourable, this could elicit negative capital market reactions. Wagenhofer 
(1990) identifies different equilibrium strategies. In particular, he identifies partial-disclosure equilibria 
in which neither very favourable nor very unfavourable information is disclosed, deterring the opponent 
from taking adverse action. Hence, when costs are sufficiently high, a firm may decide to forgo potential 
capital market benefits and not disclose or highlight the favourable information. 
To provide insights on the cost-benefit trade-off that firms face when making the disclosure decision, 
we introduce three categories of ETR conditions for which we expect different stakeholder-specific 
implications. Category 1 includes ETR conditions which are favourable for shareholders and do not 
raise concerns of stakeholder groups. According to Wagenhofer’s model, the threshold between the 
decision to disclose vs. not to disclose – translated to our research question: the decision to highlight vs. 
not to highlight – is framed by the expected market response and costs. Whether the information on the 
ETR is highlighted and if so, how, is the outcome of the sequential equilibrium in the underlying 
disclosure game. Hence, firms balance the benefits and costs of disclosing the ETR in a highly visible 
manner. Absent costs, there is no reason why firms should not highlight conditions that are favourable 
for shareholders. We identify two conditions which we assume to be favourable for shareholders but 
that would not elicit adverse actions from other stakeholders: smooth ETRs and ETRs close to the 
average industry ETR. A recent stream of literature indicates that sustainable tax strategies, i.e., smooth 
ETRs, provide useful information about future tax payments and earnings persistence (McGuire et al. 
2013, Demeré et al. 2019). Further, shareholders tend to compare the ETRs of different firms (Graham 
et al. 2011). Thus, both a smooth (i.e., low volatility) ETR and an ETR close to the industry average 
could convey a positive signal to shareholders. Both ETR conditions signal reduced uncertainty about 
future tax payments and low risks of negative tax audits, as the firm does not seem to take extreme tax 
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positions. Moreover, they may also facilitate more reliable after-tax cash-flow forecasts via cross-
industry comparisons. At the same time, they do not raise concerns about aggressive tax avoidance or 
other socially irresponsible behaviour. Hence, we expect that the disclosure of these conditions is 
primarily associated with benefits and that firms increase ETR visibility to highlight smooth or close-
to-average industry ETRs:  
H1a: ETR visibility is positively associated with smooth ETRs. 
H1b: ETR visibility is positively associated with ETRs close to the industry average.  
Absent costs induced by other stakeholders, there may still be direct opportunity costs from highlighting 
particular information in an annual report. Given readers’ limited attention span and the increasing 
length of annual reports, the various pieces of information need to be prioritised in the sense that 
managers need to decide what to present in the more prominent sections (e.g., first pages or management 
report). Although an ETR may have a favourable condition, the expected benefits of increasing the 
visibility of this information may not be sufficient to push other information further back. The recent 
trend in corporate reporting to shorten annual reports (e.g., Siemens AG) support this argument.  
With H1a and H1b, we intend to corroborate our basic assumption that the ETR is a relevant ratio that 
firms actively communicate. The next step is to introduce tension into the disclosure decision (Category 
2). Therefore, we choose an ETR condition that is favourable for shareholders and unfavourable from 
the perspective of other stakeholders (e.g., tax authorities, public). We posit that a decrease in the ETR 
represents an important condition that can be directly linked to the theoretical model developed by 
Wagenhofer (1990). As shareholders are primarily interested in a firm’s current and future after-tax cash 
flows, they generally react positively when firms reduce tax payments (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala 
2009, Koester 2011). With respect to the ETR, a lower ETR (e.g., lower than the statutory tax rate) is 
usually interpreted as a minor tax burden for a firm (Graham et al. 2011). Therefore, we expect 
decreasing ETRs to send a favourable signal to shareholders. However, decreasing ETRs may trigger 
the attention of the tax authorities as well as increased public scrutiny (Dyreng et al. 2016, Kubick et al. 
2016, Bozanic et al. 2017). Category 2 reflects the tension in the disclosure decision due to the opposing 
interests of shareholders and different stakeholder groups. Thus, we hypothesise the following: 
H2: ETR visibility is associated with decreasing ETR.  
Given that both outcomes seem plausible, additional cross-sectional analyses in Section 6 shed light on 
the underlying opposing forces. 
In Category 3, we examine ETR conditions which are unfavourable for shareholders and have unclear 
implications for other stakeholders. These hypotheses focus on the inverse conditions of our previous 
analyses to supplement the evidence. We identify three unfavourable conditions: volatile ETRs, 
increasing ETRs, and ETRs well above the industry average. Jacob and Schütt (2020) find that earnings 
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of firms with poor tax planning or volatile ETRs are discounted by market participants. High or volatile 
ETRs could indicate the absence of efficient tax planning and may suggest the occurrence of high tax 
payments that are moreover difficult to predict, a negative signal to which a firm does not want to draw 
attention (Demeré et al. 2019). Similarly, an ETR that is well above the industry average may indicate 
inefficient tax management and result in negative shareholder reactions. We expect that firms tend to 
disclose an unfavourable ETR fairly late in the report so that it does not attract a lot of attention and 
hence causes no adverse actions.  
H3a: ETR visibility is negatively associated with volatile ETRs. 
H3b: ETR visibility is negatively associated with increasing ETRs.  
H3c: ETR visibility is negatively associated with ETRs well above the industry average.  
3. Empirical Strategy 
ETR Visibility 
IAS 12 defines the GAAP effective tax rate (ETR) as total income tax expenses divided by pre-tax 
accounting income. While other ETRs, for example the Cash ETR or the Current ETR, are applied to 
address a variety of research questions (e.g., Dyreng et al. 2008; Dyreng and Lindsey 2009), the GAAP 
ETR is most appropriate for our research question. The GAAP ETR is strongly monitored by top 
executives (Graham et al. 2014) and serves as a benchmark for cross-company tax comparisons, is a 
performance measure of tax departments, is used in executive compensation contracts, and is employed 
to evaluate important corporate decisions (Robinson et al. 2010, Armstrong et al. 2012, Graham et al. 
2014, Graham et al. 2017). Based on this literature, we argue that the disclosure visibility of the GAAP 
ETR is the most suitable measure for capturing firms’ tax disclosure behaviour. 
Our disclosure proxy should capture whether firms wish to draw attention to the ETR. Given that the 
annual report is still one of the most important communication channels despite an increasing use of 
alternative disclosure media (e.g., Atwood and Reynolds 2008, De Franco et al. 2011), we analyse firms’ 
disclosure in annual reports. Our first indicator of visibility reflects whether the ETR is mentioned in 
the management report. While management reports are not required under IFRS, German companies are 
required to submit a management report under German GAAP (§ 264 I HGB, § 290 I HGB) even if they 
prepare their statements in accordance with IFRS (similar to the Management’s Discussion & Analysis 
(MD&A) section included in US firms’ 10-K files). The report should only include the most important 
financial and non-financial business indicators (§ 289 I, III HGB). In line with this notion, Li (2019) 
finds that disclosures in the MD&A section are informative for shareholders even when the information 
is repeated in other parts of the annual report. Based on survey evidence in Lee and Tweedie (1975), 
51.5 per cent of shareholders read the chairman’s statement thoroughly while 34.2 per cent do not read 
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the notes at all (Lee and Tweedie 1975, p. 281).4 In particular, nonprofessional shareholders seem to 
rely more on management discussion than on financial statements (Hodge and Pronk 2006). Hence, a 
reference to the ETR in this section indicates that the corresponding firm considers the ETR to be highly 
relevant information that should be communicated to the financial statement reader. We collect data on 
whether the ETR appears in firms’ management reports. Using a German sample and financial 
statements written in German, we search for the following German terms: “Effektivsteuer”, 
“Steuerquote”, and “Konzernsteuer”.5 We check not only whether these expressions are mentioned in 
the management report but also the context in which they are used to verify that the terms indeed refer 
to the ETR and not, for example, to the average corporate statutory tax rate.6 We create an indicator 
variable, M_REPORT, taking a value of one when the ETR is mentioned in the management report and 
zero otherwise.  
The second proxy measures the first page on which the ETR appears in an annual report. Due to the 
limited attention span of financial statement users and the increasing length of annual reports (Li 2008), 
firms place the most important information at the beginning of their reports.7 We therefore expect firms 
that wish to draw the attention to the ETR to mention it early on in their annual reports. In analogy to 
our first proxy, we search for equivalent German terms for the ETR in the annual reports and record the 
number of the page on which the ETR is first mentioned.8 We control for the length of each annual 
report by scaling our variable by the total number of report pages (similar to, e.g., Li et al. 2013).9 For 
ease of interpretation, we multiply our variable by minus one. A higher value for the second disclosure 
measure PAGE indicates that the ETR is mentioned on an earlier page, indicating greater visibility. For 
71 observations of our final sample (ten per cent), PAGE is missing because the ETR is not mentioned 
in the respective annual report. IAS 12.81c alternatively allows to either disclose the ETR or the absolute 
values, i.e., the reconciliation of expected tax payments based on accounting income and tax expenses. 
Firms in our sample that do not mention the ETR make use of this option and report only absolute values 
for tax reconciliation. To preserve sample size, we replace missing values for PAGE with negative 1. 
This is the minimum possible value for PAGE, indicating that the ETR is mentioned on the final page 
of the annual report. We posit that failure to mention the ETR is equivalent to mentioning it on the final 
page, indicating that the firm has no intention to highlight the ETR at all.10  
 
4
  More recent evidence in Bartlett and Chandler (1997) corroborates these findings.  
5
   “Effektivsteuer” = effective tax, “Steuerquote” = tax rate, “Konzernsteuer” = corporate tax.  
6
  In examining annual reports in more detail, we find other expressions for the ETR, e.g., “Ertragsteueraufwand 
in Prozent” (income tax expense percentage), which we also count. As no equivalent abbreviation for “ETR” 
exists in German, we find no relevant abbreviations.  
7
  For further evidence of information recipients’ limited attention spans, see Simon (1971), who first identified 
the concept of the Attention Economy.  
8
  We do not record the page number printed in the annual reports but instead the page number counted from page 
one (the cover page of each annual report). 
9
  When we use the unscaled variable PAGE instead of scaling by the total number of pages, the results remain 
essentially unchanged. 
10
  If we instead drop 71 observations with missing references to the ETR, results for BENCHM, DECR1, VOLETR, 
and INCR are similar to our main findings while coefficients for SMOOTH and DECR2 are insignificant.  
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ETR Conditions 
We identify two conditions that fit our Category 1 ETR favourable from the perspective of all major 
stakeholders: smooth ETR and ETR close to the average ETR industry benchmark. The first variable 
SMOOTH builds on measures of tax strategy sustainability in prior research (e.g., Guenther et al. 2017, 
McGuire et al. 2013, Neuman et al. 2013). It captures the firm-specific ETR standard deviation for a 
period of up to five years, namely the current plus four previous years (e.g., Guenther et al. 2017).11 The 
standard deviation is scaled by the absolute value of the mean ETR over the five-year period, resulting 
in the coefficient of variation (e.g., McGuire et al. 2013):  
SMOOTHit = (√[∑ (𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡−𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑛(𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡))𝑁𝑡=1 2]/𝑁𝑎𝑏𝑠(1/𝑁(∑ 𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡))𝑁𝑡=1 ) ∗ (−1)        (1) 
where i identifies the firm, t the year from one to five and N is five. The coefficient of variation is a 
unitless measure of ETR volatility. We multiply it by negative one to have the same direction for all 
ETR condition variables: a higher SMOOTH value denotes less ETR volatility and is more favourable. 
We expect to find a positive relation between SMOOTH and the disclosure variables M_REPORT and 
PAGE.  
The other ETR condition in Category 1 is an ETR close to the industry average. BENCHM measures the 
absolute deviation of the firm-level ETR from lagged average industry ETR. Industry is defined on the 
one-digit SIC level.12 After again multiplying BENCHM by negative one, a higher value denotes less 
distance to the benchmark ETR. We expect to find a positive association with M_REPORT and PAGE. 
Category 2 addresses ETR conditions that are favourable from a shareholder perspective but potentially 
associated with disclosure costs from the reactions of other stakeholders. Our measure in Category 2 are 
decreasing ETRs which we capture with two variables: DECR1 and DECR2. DECR1 is an indicator 
variable equal to one when the firm’s current year ETR is lower than the prior year’s ETR, and zero 
otherwise. Extending the period, indicator variable DECR2 is valued at one when the ETR decreased in 
the current and previous years, and zero otherwise.13 Testing H2, we do not make predictions about the 
association between DECR1 and DECR2 and the disclosure visibility variables M_REPORT and PAGE.   
In ETR Category 3, we examine conditions that are unfavourable from a shareholder perspective. We 
use the following three measures: VOLETR, INCR, and ABOVE_BENCHM. To create VOLETR, we take 
 
11
  We use a rolling five-year window. 
12  As robustness test, we apply a more refined industry classification using the two-digit SIC code for an extended 
sample. We calculate the industry average of an international sample with 520,075 observations available from 
the Worldscope database (after dropping firms that are smaller than the smallest firm in our sample). The 
coefficients of estimations for the extended sample have the same sign and significance level and increase in 
magnitude relative to findings for BENCHM in our main tests.  
13
  In other words, ETR in t < ETR in t-1 < ETR in t-2. 
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the rolling five-year ETR standard deviation (from the calculation of SMOOTH) over all firms in one 
year and cut it into deciles. VOLETR is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm’s ETR lies within 
the two highest of these deciles, zero otherwise. Hence, a value of one indicates a very volatile ETR. 
The second variable, INCR, is an indicator variable equal to one when the ETR increased in the current 
year relative to the previous year. Finally, ABOVE_BENCHM is an indicator variable equal to one when 
the ETR exceeds the lagged industry mean ETR by more than ten per cent. All three variables indicate 
conditions that are not favourable from a shareholder perspective.  
Regression Model 
To analyse the relation between ETR visibility and the ETR condition, we estimate the following 
regression model: 
ETRDISCLit = β0 + β1 ETRCONDit + β2 ETRit + β3 SIZEit + β4ROAit + β5 AUDit +  
β6 ARSCOREit + β7 PPEit + β8 R&Dit + β9 LEVit + β10 TRENDt + βk IndustryFE + εit     (2)   
where ε is the error term, i indicates the firm and t the year. The variables are defined in Table 1. We 
estimate the model with two alternative variables for ETRDISCL, representing above-defined disclosure 
measures M_REPORT and PAGE. Further, we estimate seven different models per dependent variable 
where ETRCOND represents ETR measures SMOOTH, BENCHM, DECR1, DECR2, VOLETR, INCR, 
and ABOVE_BENCHM. While we estimate OLS regressions for the dependent variable PAGE, we use 
logit models for dichotomous dependent variable M_REPORT.14 All models are estimated with standard 
errors clustered by firm and include industry-fixed effects.15 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
To control for the level of the current ETR, we include ETR in our regressions. It is measured as total 
income tax expense divided by pre-tax income. Further control variables are derived from the disclosure 
and tax literature (e.g., Li 2008, Hope et al. 2013, Bova et al. 2015): SIZE is the firm size and is measured 
by the natural logarithm of sales, ROA is the return on assets calculated as pre-tax income divided by 
lagged total assets, AUD is an indicator variable indicating whether a firm is audited by one of the Big4 
auditors, PPE measures gross property, plant, and equipment divided by lagged total assets, R&D are 
research and development expenses divided by lagged total assets, LEV is the ratio of long-term debt to 
total assets and measures how strongly a firm is leveraged, and TREND is a yearly increasing variable 
that captures whether a linear trend exists in the development of the dependent variable.  
 
14
  If we instead estimate OLS models for M_REPORT or Tobit model for PAGE (which is censored at -1 and 0) 
results are qualitatively unchanged.  
15
  Year-fixed effects are not included due to the TREND variable. If we replace the variable with year-fixed effects, 
our inferences are not affected. Firm-fixed effects are only included in robustness tests due to the unbalanced 
sample and short sample period.  
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Our additional control variable, ARSCORE, is a disclosure score of the overall level of annual report 
content quality. This is an important variable as it is a proxy for the general (ETR-unrelated) disclosure 
behaviour of a firm. The score is based on the German yearly annual report contest “Der beste 
Geschäftsbericht” (Baetge 1997). For this competition, a research group analyses the annual reports of 
large German listed companies with respect to content, design, and language every year. We use results 
of the “annual report content” category where scores range from zero to 100 (100 denotes the highest 
level of content quality). However, this data is only available for part of our sample period. Scores for 
the periods 2005 to 2012 and 2014 to 2016 are obtained from Manager Magazin, a German business 
periodical or provided directly by the Baetge research group. For the remaining sample years, the annual 
report contest was not carried out and so we use data from an alternative contest, “Investors’ Darling”, 
which is organised by the Chair of Accounting and Auditing at Leipzig Graduate School of Management 
(HHL). Data is available online (ID 2020) and starts with the scores for 2013. We use the scores of the 
“reporting annual report” category which also range from zero to 100. To ensure the two rankings are 
comparable, we examine the yearly correlation of the scores for the overlapping years 2014 to 2016.16 
We find a positive and significant (at least at the five per cent level) Spearman correlation of between 
0.38 and 040. For our final variable ARSCORE, we use the yearly score from the Baetge research group 
ranking for the periods 2005 to 2012 and 2014 to 2016 and from the Investors’ Darling ranking for 2013 
and the period 2017 to 2018. The score is divided by 100, resulting in a score of between zero and one, 
with a higher score indicating higher quality disclosure.  
4. Data 
Sample 
Our sample covers firm-year observations for German DAX30 and MDAX firms for the period 2005 to 
2018. We examine the largest and most visible German firms because they attract considerable public 
attention and managers of these firms can reasonably expect their tax disclosures to be scrutinized by a 
broad audience. While this characteristic of our sample attenuates the threat of increased tax auditor 
attention because firms of this size are subject to constant tax audits, anecdotal evidence indicates that 
large firms still do not want to highlight tax aggressive behaviour because this can negatively affect the 
tax audit climate (see Appendix A for details).  
The sample period starts in 2005 because we include only IFRS-adopting firms in our sample to 
eliminate any impact of standard-specific disclosure requirements. We obtain financial and accounting 
data from Thomson Reuters’ Worldscope database. Disclosure information is individually collected 
from firms’ annual reports. The sample selection is described in Table 2.  
 
16
  If we drop all years for which the Baetge research group ranking is not available (169 observations), results are 
very similar to our main results except for SMOOTH being no longer significant in M_REPORT models. 
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    [Insert Table 2 here] 
Because not all of our 80 sample firms existed or were listed in 2005 and due to the limited availability 
of annual reports, our initial sample is an unbalanced panel with 1,070 firm-year observations. We 
exclude 21 observations for which financial statements were prepared under non-IFRS reporting 
standards.17 Further, we drop observations with negative pre-tax income or negative tax expenses and 
cases where tax expense exceeds pre-tax income. These cases are potentially interesting and the 
disclosure may differ from the average disclosure behaviour. Therefore, we implement additional tests 
in Section 6 to examine these abnormal ETRs, yet exclude the observations from our main tests because 
they can indicate unusual circumstances which affect generalisability and may bias our main results. By 
eliminating these outliers, we lose 95 observations. Our sample is further reduced by 255 observations 
with missing data. The final sample contains 699 observations of 70 firms.  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Figure 2 presents the yearly development of the mean for the disclosure visibility variables M_REPORT 
in Panel A and PAGE (before multiplying by negative one) in Panel B. Panel B additionally shows the 
development for the unscaled variable PAGE. Some minor yearly changes in the mean are observable 
in all three graphs but without a trend and with insignificant differences in t-tests of consecutive years.  
     [Insert Figure 2 here] 
Summary statistics for the regression variables are presented in Panel A of Table 3. The variables for 
page number and the smoothing and benchmark variables are per construction negative. We find that 78 
per cent of our observations disclose the ETR in the management report (M_REPORT). The ETR is 
disclosed on average on page 42 of the annual report, with the earliest reference on page 2 (PAGE 
unscaled). For 56 per cent of all observations, the ETR decreases from the prior to the current year 
(DECR1) and 26 per cent of cases show two subsequent decreases (DECR2). The average distance from 
the mean lagged industry ETR is 0.08 (BENCHM)18 and 25 per cent of all observations have an ETR of 
more than ten per cent above the mean lagged industry ETR (ABOVE_BENCHM). Comparing the mean 
for DECR1 and INCR indicates that the variables perfectly split the sample (adding up to 100 per cent), 
with no observation where the ETR did not change over the previous year. The average ETR is 0.29, 
which is very close to the current German corporate statutory tax rate.  
 [Insert Table 3 here] 
 
17
  Firms already applying international standards (e.g., US-GAAP) were allowed to defer IFRS adoption to 2007. 
18
  The value of 0.08 must be interpreted as follows: when the lagged industry ETR has a mean of, e.g., 0.30, the 
firm ETR deviates by 0.08 on average. As the value is expressed in absolute terms, it could indicate an ETR of 
0.22 or 0.38. The negative sign results from multiplying the value by -1 to align the direction with the other 
ETRCOND variables.   
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Panel B of Table 3 divides the sample into firm-years with decreasing and increasing ETRs. An 
observation is assigned to the decreasing ETR sample when variable DECR1 takes a value of one, i.e., 
when the ETR decreased from the previous to the current year. The increasing ETR sample includes 
those observations for which the variable INCR is one, i.e., a higher ETR in the current year. The mean 
and median for M_REPORT are higher for the sample with decreasing ETRs. The difference is 
significant at least on the ten per cent level according to t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. This 
comparison serves as initial evidence of a higher likelihood that firms disclose the ETR in the 
management report when the ETR is decreasing. Further, the ETR is disclosed on average on an earlier 
page for firms with decreasing ETRs, with a significant mean difference for PAGE. Most of the ETR 
condition variables differ significantly between the two samples. Regarding the control variables, we 
find significant differences for ETR, ROA, ARSCORE, R&D, and TREND. A Spearman correlation 
matrix is presented in Table OA1 of the online appendix.  
5. Regression Results 
Table 4 Panel A presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT. Given the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, we estimate a logit model instead of applying OLS. 
Standard errors clustered by firm are presented below the coefficients in parentheses. Industry-fixed 
effects are included in all models but not reported. The first two columns present the results for our tests 
of Category 1 ETRs. The two ETR condition variables SMOOTH and BENCHM have positive 
coefficients, significant at least on the five per cent level. These results corroborate our assumption that 
the ETR is highlighted, i.e., disclosed in the management report, when the ETR condition is favourable 
for shareholders and not associated with costs. The results for Category 2 are in columns three and four. 
Both DECR variables have positive and significant coefficients, suggesting that the likelihood of a firm 
reporting the ETR in its management report increases when the ETR is decreasing. This finding indicates 
that the expected benefits of highlighting the ETR outweigh the expected costs. The regression results 
for Category 3 ETRs (unfavourable conditions) are presented in the last three columns. The coefficients 
for volatile (VOLETR) and increasing (INCR) ETRs are negative and significant, and insignificant for 
ETRs well above the industry average (ABOVE_BENCHM). A reverse relation with M_REPORT 
relative to the other categories suggests that disclosure costs prevent firms from highlighting the ETR 
when it is unfavourable for shareholders. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Regarding the control variables, the ETR level (ETR) is not significantly related to M_REPORT in most 
models, indicating that the disclosure decision is not based on the level alone but rather on the specific 
ETR condition (additional tests in Section 6 provide further insights on the relation between the ETR 
level and disclosure behaviour). We find a positive and significant coefficient for ARSCORE, suggesting 
that the decision whether to report the ETR in the management report is related to overall disclosure 
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behaviour. This provides support for the choice of our disclosure variable, which captures a specific 
disclosure decision but at the same time contributes to the general annual report quality. The positive 
and significant coefficient for ROA indicates that more profitable firms are more likely to disclose the 
ETR in the management report, in line with prior literature on a positive association between disclosure 
and profitability (e.g., Lang and Lundholm 1993). Further, the results show a significantly positive 
(negative) coefficient for R&D (PPE), suggesting a higher (lower) likelihood of ETR disclosure in the 
management report for more research-active (long-term asset intensive) firms. The remaining control 
variables are not significantly related to disclosure visibility, presumably due to the nature of the 
disclosure variable which is tailored to reflect ETR-specific disclosure behaviour.  
Panel B of Table 4 presents the results of the OLS estimations with our second disclosure visibility 
variable PAGE. All ETR condition variables have the same sign as in Panel A and are significant at least 
on the five per cent level (except for ABOVE_BENCHM which again has an insignificant coefficient). 
The findings of Panel B indicate that the ETR is disclosed on an earlier (later) page in the annual report 
if the condition is (un-)favourable for shareholders. This finding also holds for decreasing ETRs 
(Category 2) which we assume to be associated with disclosure costs due to adverse actions from 
stakeholders. The control variables ARSCORE and PPE have the same sign and similar significance as 
in Panel A, again indicating a positive association with overall annual report quality and a negative 
association with long-term asset intensity. All other control variables have insignificant coefficients.  
In sum, the findings in Table 4 provide support for our hypotheses. The results for both disclosure 
measures consistently indicate a higher visibility for ETR conditions which are favourable from a 
shareholder perspective. This inference holds for ETR conditions not associated with disclosure costs 
(Category 1) and, more importantly, also for decreasing ETRs associated with disclosure costs 
(Category 2). This suggests that firms estimate the benefits of drawing attention to shareholder 
favourable ETRs to outweigh the potential costs of the disclosure.  
6. Additional Tests 
High Disclosure Cost Firms 
To address cross-sectional differences in the ETR disclosure cost-benefit trade-off, we identify two 
groups of firms for which we expect disclosure costs to be particularly high: family firms and consumer-
oriented firms. Family firms are subject to different agency conflicts than non-family firms, resulting in 
family-firm-specific financial disclosure decisions (Ali et al. 2007, Chen et al. 2010, Gomez-Mejia et 
al. 2014). Chen et al. (2008) find that family firms issue fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls 
but more earnings warnings, consistent with higher reputational and litigation concerns. Further support 
for reputational concerns in family firms comes from Chen et al. (2010), documenting that family firms 
are less tax aggressive than non-family firms. Similar evidence is observable for consumer-oriented 
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firms. Austin and Wilson (2017) find that firms with valuable consumer brands engage in less tax 
avoidance, showing a positive association between reputation and ETR. This is corroborated by 
evidence from tax expert interviews in Bruehne and Schanz (2018), indicating that firms with consumer-
oriented business models face higher public pressure than business-to-business oriented firms. For both 
groups of firms, reputation is of considerable importance. Therefore, we assume the disclosure costs of 
highlighting a shareholder favourable ETR to be particularly high for family and consumer-oriented 
firms, potentially affecting the cost-benefit trade-off in the disclosure decision.  
To test this assumption, we create two indicator variables, one representing family firms and one 
identifying consumer-oriented firms. We identify family firms based on whether a firm is listed on the 
DAXplus family 30 index.19 If listed, the indicator variable FAMILY is one, otherwise zero. Nine firms 
in our sample are classified as a family firm. To identify consumer-oriented firms, we use a classification 
for business-to-consumer (B2C) firms based on the two-digit SIC code which is common in the 
marketing literature (Srinivasan et al. 2011). The indicator variable B2C receives a value of one if a firm 
has the following SIC code: 20 21, 22, 23 and 31, otherwise zero. We identify four firms as B2C. We 
repeat our main tests including the respective indicator variable and interactions between the indicator 
and the ETR condition variables.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
The results for family firms are presented in Table 5 Panel A for M_REPORT and Panel B for PAGE. 
Coefficients for the ETR condition variables have the same sign and very similar significance levels and 
magnitudes as in Table 4 for both dependent variables M_REPORT and PAGE. This indicates that the 
relation between ETR condition and disclosure visibility in our main tests is corroborated for non-family 
firms. The FAMILY variable has a significantly positive coefficient in Panel A yet is mainly insignificant 
in Panel B, suggesting that family firms are on average more likely to disclose the ETR in the 
management report. However, this does not hold for the specific ETR conditions as all interactions in 
Panel A have insignificant coefficients, suggesting that the likelihood of disclosing the ETR in the 
management report if it has a favourable or unfavourable condition is no different for family firms.  
Interestingly, most of the interaction coefficients in Panel B are significant and have the opposite signs 
of the main variables. In particular, the interactions between FAMILY and ETR condition variables from 
Categories 1 and 2 have negative coefficients, implying that family firms disclose the ETR on a later 
page than non-family firms if it is smooth or decreasing. The results for Category 3 provide further 
support for the different disclosure behaviour of family firms, again showing interaction coefficients 
 
19
  A firm qualifies for this index if the founding families hold at least a 25 per cent share of the voting rights or sit 
on the management or supervisory board and hold at least a 5 per cent share of the voting rights. We consider 
the index composition as of May 11, 2020. See Deutsche Börse (2009) for details.  
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with reverse signs. Family firms report the ETR on average on an earlier page than non-family firms 
when the ETR is volatile or increasing.   
Altogether, these findings suggest that the ETR disclosure behaviour of family firms differs significantly 
from that of non-family firms. Results are consistent with prior literature in that family firms do not 
highlight low ETRs due to reputational concerns (Chen et al. 2010) and increase disclosure of 
unfavourable information to avoid litigation (Chen et al. 2008). Further, this evidence provides support 
for our assumption that ETR disclosure visibility is an outcome of trading off the costs and benefits of 
disclosure.  
The results for the second group of firms with potentially high disclosure costs, consumer-oriented firms, 
are presented in the online appendix (Table OA2). We again find the same coefficient sign and similar 
magnitude and significance level for most of our ETR condition variables in models with both dependent 
variables,20 extending our main findings to non-B2C firms. The variable B2C has a positive and mainly 
significant coefficient which suggests that consumer-oriented firms on average increase disclosure 
visibility of the ETR. However, all interaction coefficients in the M_REPORT models have insignificant 
coefficients with mixed signs. Coefficients in estimations with the dependent variable PAGE have 
opposite signs to the main effect but are insignificant, with the exception of DECR2*B2C. Hence, we 
do not find evidence of a significantly different relation between disclosure visibility and our ETR 
conditions for consumer-oriented firms. This result is consistent with Hoopes et al. (2018) who find only 
weak effects of tax disclosure on consumer sentiment. However, we advise caution since our findings 
could be affected by the small number of firms classified as consumer-oriented in our sample.  
ETR Level and Degree of Decrease 
The two decrease variables used in our Category 2 tests capture every form of decrease – as soon as the 
ETR level in t is lower than the ETR in t-1 (or ETRt < ETRt-1 < ETRt-2 for DECR2), the indicator variable 
is one. However, not every ETR decrease has the same implications. For example, a decrease from an 
ETR level of 10 per cent to an ETR level of 5 per cent is probably associated with different disclosure 
costs and benefits than a decrease from 35 to 30 per cent. Similarly, we expect a decrease by 20 
percentage points to have different implications than a decrease by 2 percentage points. Evidence for 
nuanced investor preferences regarding the ETR level comes, for example, from Hanlon and Slemrod 
(2009), who find that while investors generally appreciate tax avoidance, they react negatively to overly 
aggressive tax avoidance. In a similar vein, Inger and Stekelberg (2020) document that investors prefer 
socially responsible forms of tax avoidance.  
 
20
  The interaction variable for B2C and VOLETR was dropped from our tests due to collinearity. This is a 
consequence of the small number of firms classified as B2C, resulting in a constant value of zero for the 
interaction of B2C and VOLETR. Therefore, our tests do not include estimations for the ETR condition 
VOLETR.  
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To address the heterogeneity in ETR decreases, we perform a number of supplemental tests in which 
we address a) the level from which the ETR decreases and b) the degree of the decrease. Therefore, we 
redefine our DECR1 variable. To examine the level from which the ETR decreases, we split the ETR 
distribution into quartiles and separately examine decreases from ETR levels in the following percentage 
ranges: 75 to 100, 50 to 75, 25 to 50, and 0 to 25. We expect the disclosure costs to be higher in the top 
and bottom ranges as very low ETRs are likely to attract public attention and very high ETRs are disliked 
by investors. To analyse the degree of the decrease, we define four ranges of percentage point decreases 
which we believe to be reasonable thresholds: 0 to 5, 5 to 10, 10 to 20, and more than 20 percentage 
points.21 We expect disclosure costs to be particularly high for large decreases as they provoke 
considerable attention. We create an indicator variable that has the value of one if the ETR decreases 
from the respective level or the ETR decreases by the percentage points in the respective range.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
The results for ETR level tests are presented in Panel A and for ETR degree tests in Panel B of Table 6. 
The findings in Panel A indicate significant coefficients for the DECR variable only in the range of 25 
to 50. In this range, we find consistently positive and significant coefficients for models with either 
M_REPORT or PAGE as the dependent variable. ETR decreases from levels above or below this range 
show mainly negative coefficients and are not significantly associated with disclosure visibility. The 
results suggest that the ETR is not highlighted despite a decrease if the ETR is not at conventional levels, 
consistent with high disclosure costs at the margins. The results in Panel B follow a similar line: we find 
a positive and significant relation with disclosure visibility (for both dependent variables) for decreasing 
ETRs only if the decrease is in the lowest range between 0 and 5 percentage points. For large decreases 
(>20), the sign flips and we find a significantly negative coefficient. This suggests that only moderate 
decreases are highlighted while visibility is reduced for extreme decreases.  
In sum, both sets of additional tests indicate that ETR decreases are only highlighted if they are moderate 
and within a reasonable ETR range, drawing attention away from cases that are abnormal or extreme. 
This finding is particularly interesting because it supports our theoretical expectation of disclosure 
benefits in the case of a favourable ETR. An alternative theory is that firms do not highlight favourable 
conditions but rather disclose the ETR early and visibly if it has a condition that requires additional 
explanations. The additional tests in Table 6 document that this alternative theory does not explain the 
disclosure behaviour of the average firm in our sample.  
 
 
 
21
  We have only few observations (25) in the highest decrease range of more than 20 percentage points, therefore 
a more granular split above 20 does not make sense for our sample.  
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Abnormal ETR Conditions 
Following the same notion as in the ETR level and degree tests, we further explore disclosure behaviour 
for decreasing but unusual ETRs by extending our sample. We include observations that were previously 
dropped from the sample (see Table 2) because they have abnormal values for either the numerator (total 
tax expense) or the denominator (pre-tax income) of the ETR. The reason for excluding the observations 
is that unusual circumstances may produce systematic differences in disclosure behaviour in these cases. 
To assess this assumption, we perform additional tests with the (95) observations included in our sample. 
We create indicator variables with the value of one if pre-tax income is negative (NEG_PTI), total 
income tax expense is negative (NEG_TTAX), or if both are negative (NEG_BOTH), and zero otherwise. 
We include these indicator variables and interactions of the indicator variables with DECR1 and DECR2 
in our main models. The results are presented in Table OA3 of the online appendix. The coefficients for 
DECR1 and DECR2 have significantly positive coefficients, similar to our main results. NEG_TTAX 
has a highly significant and negative coefficient in all models, indicating that firms on average reduce 
disclosure visibility when total income tax expense is negative. With respect to the interactions, 
DECR2*NEG_PTI shows a significantly negative coefficient for both dependent variables M_REPORT 
and PAGE while the other coefficients are insignificant. Considering the coefficient size of the 
interaction, this finding suggests that firms do not increase or even decrease visibility when, at the same 
time, the ETR is decreasing and pre-tax income is negative. This supports inferences from our other 
additional tests, consistent with firms only highlighting decreasing ETRs if the ETR is in a “reasonable” 
range and reducing visibility when the ETR is abnormal.  
7. Sensitivity Tests 
Endogeneity 
In this section, we address potential endogeneity concerns. First, we address the concern of simultaneity 
which arises because firms have influence on both the disclosure visibility and the ETR condition. 
Hence, it is not obvious which comes first and firms may even decide on both at the same time. This 
concern is partly mitigated by anecdotal evidence from our interviews, indicating that the ETR is usually 
determined first and the disclosure is adjusted to the ETR level in the second step. Often, different 
departments are responsible for deciding to manage the ETR level (tax manager) and disclose the ETR 
(investor relations) (see Appendix A for details).  
To address the remaining concerns, we empirically tackle the endogeneity of the ETR condition 
variables by following prior research (Larcker and Rusticus 2010) and applying an instrumental variable 
approach in a two-stage least squares estimation (2SLS). The challenge here is to identify instruments 
that have a non-zero partial correlation with the ETR condition variables and a zero correlation with the 
error term in our main regression (Roberts and Whited 2013). We choose four instruments that we 
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believe fulfil these requirements based on theoretical arguments and prior literature. The first two are 
determinants of the ETR, hand-collected from the tax rate reconciliation in the tax footnote: the foreign 
tax rate differential and the effect of tax loss carryforwards.  
Both variables affect the ETR by construction as the purpose of the tax rate reconciliation is to explain 
ETR determinants. Evidence in prior literature further supports the effect of these variables on the ETR 
(e.g., Rego 2003, Hope et al. 2013, Drake et al. 2020). At the same time, we see no obvious reason why 
these variables should systematically affect ETR disclosure behaviour. The foreign tax rate differential 
indicates the ETR effect of differences between the domestic statutory tax rate and tax rates in foreign 
jurisdictions. While one could argue that the ETR disclosure behaviour of a multinational firm differs 
from that of a domestic-only firm, our sample includes only the largest German firms which are a rather 
homogenous group when it comes to international activity. The tax loss carryforwards item represents 
mainly unexpected effects because deferred tax assets are usually recognised for tax loss carryforwards, 
offsetting the effect on the ETR.22 However, if a firm unexpectedly uses tax loss carryforwards for which 
no deferred taxes have been recognised (e.g., if taxable income is higher than expected), this affects the 
ETR and is reflected in this item. This unexpected use describes a rather complex scenario related to 
deferred taxes which is unlikely to be reflected in firms’ ETR disclosure behaviour. We measure our 
first two instruments as the foreign tax rate differential (FRDIFF) and the tax loss carryforward effect 
(TLCF), each scaled by pre-tax income.  
Instruments three and four are based on Drake et al. (2020) (in the following DHL). DHL document that 
the valuation allowance explains large parts of the ETR development over time. A valuation allowance 
is a construct under United States (US) GAAP which reduces deferred tax assets when it is more likely 
than not that the future benefit of deferred tax assets will not be realised. While the term “valuation 
allowance” is not applicable under IFRS, the recognition of deferred tax assets similarly depends on the 
expectation of future taxable profits (IAS 12.34, IAS 12.82). Hence, we expect determinants of the 
valuation allowance (identified by DHL as a major driver of the ETR) to be also suitable determinants 
of the ETR in our context. DHL propose a prediction model to estimate the probability of a valuation 
allowance release based on four variables: the number of pre-tax losses in a five-year period, the 
existence of and change in tax loss carryforwards, and free cash flow. Of these variables, we use the 
number of pre-tax losses and free cash flow as instruments in our 2SLS estimation. We do not include 
the tax loss carryforward variables as the data is not available for our sample and we already use an 
instrument related to tax loss carryforwards from the tax rate reconciliation. We see no reason why the 
history of losses or the free cash flow should systematically affect the ETR disclosure behaviour other 
 
22
  If a firm incurs a pre-tax loss, this affects the denominator of the ETR. However, if the firm expects that the 
loss can be offset against taxable income in the future, deferred tax assets are recognised. The recognition of 
deferred tax assets creates a deferred tax revenue, which affects the nominator of the ETR and offsets the effect 
of the loss. In future periods, when the loss is used and reduces taxable income, the deferred tax asset is 
derecognised and again offsets the effect of the loss on the ETR.  
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than through the ETR condition. Following DHL, we measure 5YEARLOSS as a count variable ranging 
from zero to four, representing the number of negative pre-tax income in the years from t-4 to t-1 (in 
our main sample, we only include firms with positive pre-tax income in t). The final instrument FCF is 
measured as cash flow net of capital expenditures, scaled by lagged total assets.  
On the first stage of our 2SLS estimation, we model the potentially endogenous variables using our 
instruments as follows: 
ENDO_VARit = γ0 + γl INSTRUMENTSit + γm CONTROLSit + βn IndustryFE + ζit           (3)   
where ENDO_VAR are either the ETRCOND variables from our baseline models or the control variable 
ETR which is also potentially endogenous. INSTRUMENTS are the four instruments explained above: 
5YEARLOSS, FCF, TLCF, and FRDIFF. CONTROLS are the control variables as previously described, 
except for ETR which is treated as endogenous in this estimation. Results for the first stage estimations 
are presented in the online appendix (Table OA4 Panel A). We find a significant coefficient for at least 
one of our instruments in each regression. 5YEARLOSS is the strongest instrument with a significantly 
negative relation with all of the ETR conditions in Categories 1 and 2, and a significantly positive 
association with VOLETR and INCR in Category 3.23 We report additional post-estimation test results 
to further assess the quality our instruments. Shea’s partial R² measures the correlation between the 
endogenous variable and the instruments after partialling out the effect of the control variables. While 
we observe reasonable values for some of our models (e.g., 0.054 for ETR and 0.078 for VOLETR), the 
instruments seem to have low explanatory power in other models (e.g., 0.010 for DECR1 and 0.004 for 
ABOVE_BENCHM). Given the difficulty to find strong instruments for all of our diverse ETR 
conditions, we believe that, while they are not strong in all cases, the chosen variables are suitable for 
the 2SLS estimation.   
Table OA4 Panel B and C in the online appendix present results for the second stage estimations. The 
findings are consistent with the baseline regressions in Table 4 with only minor differences for most of 
the coefficients. These results mitigate endogeneity concerns and corroborate our main inferences.  
Another endogeneity concern refers to correlated omitted variables. For example, unobservable firm-
specific levels of tax awareness may cause some firms to strive for a favourable ETR condition and 
intensify communication at the same time while other firms care less about taxes. To address time-
invariant firm-specific correlated omitted variables, we replace industry-fixed effect in our baseline 
regression with firm- and year-fixed effects (Prabhala and Li 2008, Amir et al. 2016). We estimate the 
 
23
  Surprisingly, we do not find significant results for FRDIFF although it is collected from the tax reconciliation 
and should be correlated with ETR. Manual inspection of several observations reveals considerable 
inconsistencies within many firms. Assuming that group structures and thus distribution of profits does not 
fluctuate too much over time, other effects (e.g., aperiodic tax expenses, changes in deferred taxes) seem to be 
bunched together with ordinary foreign income tax expenses. Since 25 per cent of our observations are non-
negative, cancelling out might also be an issue. The second stage results remain qualitatively unchanged if we 
exclude this instrument from the first stage regression. 
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models including all control variables except for TREND which is replaced by year-fixed effects and 
AUD which has very low variation over time. Results for the fixed-effects estimations are presented in 
Table OA5 in the online appendix. We find substantially weaker results compared to our main tests. Of 
the ETR condition variables, only SMOOTH (for the PAGE model) and VOLETR (for M_REPORT and 
PAGE) have significant coefficients with the expected sign; all other coefficients are insignificant. While 
these results could increase concerns about omitted variables, it is very likely that they are driven by the 
lack of within-firm variation of our variables and the unbalanced panel structure of our sample. 
Specifically, only 12 firms (17 per cent of our sample firms) have a complete time-series of 14 years 
while 30 firms (43 per cent) have only six or less consecutive years. As a direct consequence, 406 
observations are dropped from the fixed effects estimation of the M_REPORT models due to a lack of 
within-firm variation, considerably reducing the power of the tests. The incomplete time-series for most 
of our sample firms likely also contributes to the weak results for the PAGE models.  
Other Robustness Tests 
We examine the robustness of our main findings in several additional sensitivity analyses. First, we 
control for concerns related to Germany’s 2008 corporate tax reform. Among the most noteworthy 
changes of the tax reform is a cut in the corporate income tax rate from 25 to 15 per cent. However, 
other changes, like the interest-capping rule or the reduction of certain tax deductions, could also affect 
the ETR. Hence, a lower ETR after the reform does not necessarily indicate an intentional reduction in 
the ETR but likely results from the tax rate cut. To control for the effect of the tax reform, we re-estimate 
our main regressions while excluding 174 observations for the period before 2009. Results (untabulated) 
show weaker significance levels for single variables but are qualitatively unchanged relative to our main 
findings.  
Prior studies often exclude observations from utilities and financial institutions because such firms are 
subject to different regulations and reporting requirements (see, e.g., Hanlon 2005). Hence, we repeat 
our main tests after excluding 18 observations from these industries (SIC 4900-4999 and SIC 6000-
6099). The results (untabulated) are very close to our main findings and do not affect our inferences.   
Finally, we add two additional variables to our baseline models to control for corporate governance. 
Prior literature indicates a relation between corporate governance and firms’ tax avoidance and also with 
accounting quality (Armstrong et al. 2015, Larcker et al. 2007). Hence, corporate governance may affect 
the ETR disclosure behaviour. In line with prior literature (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Larcker et al. 
2007), we include the number of block holders and the fraction of shares owned by block holders as 
corporate governance measures. We do not include these variables in our main tests because we only 
have the most recent block holder information, no historic data, for this variable. Including the corporate 
governance variables does not affect our inferences and results in insignificant coefficients for both 
control variables.  
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8. Conclusion 
We examine the visibility of ETR information in financial statements. To examine the effect of different 
stakeholder-specific preferences on firms’ disclosure behaviour, we analyse several ETR conditions 
classified into three categories. First, we provide descriptive evidence showing that the ETR is 
frequently disclosed in the management reports of annual reports, indicating that firms attach 
considerable importance to it. Second, we find increased ETR visibility when the ETR has a favourable 
condition from a shareholder-oriented perspective. This finding holds for our ETR Category 1 (smooth 
or close to the average industry ETR) and Category 2 (decreasing ETR), indicating that visibility is 
higher even if considerable disclosure costs can be expected. The Category 3 results suggest reduced 
visibility for unfavourable ETR conditions (volatile or increasing ETR). In additional tests, we find that 
the ETR disclosure of family firms differs from that of non-family firms, suggesting cross-sectional 
differences in the cost-benefit trade-off. Further, we document that the ETR visibility varies with the 
level of the ETR and the degree of the decrease. While ETR decreases from usual levels and of moderate 
degree are highlighted, visibility does not increase or even decreases for extreme cases. Our findings 
suggest that the expected benefits of highlighting favourable ETRs seem to outweigh the predicted costs 
resulting from other stakeholders’ concerns, but only if the ETR level and decrease is not unusual.  
This study may be subject to endogeneity concerns as both the dependent variable and the main variables 
of interest are potentially choice variables of firms. This concern is mitigated by anecdotal evidence 
from interviews with tax directors and addressed by an instrumental variable estimation in our sensitivity 
tests, showing robust evidence of the relation between ETR conditions and disclosure visibility. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the possibility that endogeneity issues affect our inferences, and our 
results must be interpreted with this caveat in mind.  
In providing evidence of firms’ disclosure incentives, we contribute to the tax disclosure literature and 
help explain prior evidence of cross-sectional differences in firms’ disclosure behaviours (e.g., Kvaal 
and Nobes 2013). Moreover, our results suggest that the way ETRs are disclosed is a powerful signal. 
Our evidence may encourage investors to consider ETR information in their assessment of a firm’s tax 
status and tax risks and ultimately in their decision-making. Specifically, low ETR disclosure visibility 
can be an indicator of an unfavourable or extreme ETR and could hence encourage investors and other 
financial statement readers to scrutinize tax information more closely. Current initiatives to increase 
mandatory tax transparency may affect firms’ cost-benefit trade-offs. Thus, our findings also suggest 
that increased mandatory tax disclosure may have an (unintended) impact on voluntary disclosure 
behaviour by dampening or crowding out the signal from voluntarily highlighted ETR information. 
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APPENDIX A 
1. Anecdotal Evidence from Interviews 
Given our interest in managers’ disclosure strategies, we chose to conduct a few semi-structured 
interviews to accompany our findings from archival data analyses with anecdotal evidence. We prepared 
specific questions but were free to deviate from these to pursue any interesting ideas that may come up 
during the interview, returning to the planned interview questions after a while. This semi-structured 
approach allowed us to obtain a comprehensive overview. We found that this approach encouraged the 
interviewees to further contextualize their responses. This open form generated some differences in 
topics across the interviews, including a variety of follow-up questions from the interviewer. As the 
purpose of these interviews was to collect some anecdotal evidence we anticipated and indeed found 
that this was a very fruitful way to obtain a deeper insight into experienced tax managers’ reasoning on 
this topic.  
We asked the tax managers to agree to an interview on ETRs so we could obtain some practitioners’ 
views on the topic in terms of tax planning and tax reporting. The interviewees were asked to commit 
to a 30-minute time slot, yet most interviews were approximately 45 minutes in length. All were 
conducted by the same author by telephone. We did not share the prepared questions upfront. The 
interviewees were told that their responses would be confidential and that neither their name, nor their 
company’s name, nor any identifying information would be published. Given the specificity of the 
responses we received, we believe the interviewees were very candid.  
We conducted five interviews. All interviewees are Global Heads of Taxes of major German 
multinationals (mostly DAX30-listed) and have occupied their positions for many years. Their 
companies are all headquartered in Germany and ranged from manufacturing and service-oriented firms, 
firms with consumer- and business-oriented business models, firms with different shares of institutional, 
private equity and retail investors, and family firms. 
The following table summarizes the respective quotes and displays them by topic.
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Question / topic Topic-specific responses of five Global Heads of Taxes of major German multinational corporations 
Sequence of ETR planning and disclosure strategy 
When do you actively report on your ETR? How do you 
determine how you report on the ETR?  
1. Do you report after the ETR is already established? 
2. Do you simultaneously plan the ETR and report on it? 
3. Do you determine the disclosure strategy regardless of 
the level (condition) of the ETR? 
4. Do you discuss, develop and readjust the disclosure 
strategy if the ETR is unusual?  
The ETR is planned very carefully for two years and is permanently reviewed.  
The ETR is planned as well as possible over five years – of course, with high uncertainty.  
We regularly exchange information with the Investor Relations department.  
If we expect an unusual ETR, we reach out to the Investor Relations department at an early stage. 
On the basis of the outcome of the ETR the Head of Taxes provides all necessary explanations to the Investor Relations department.  
There is close coordination with the Investor Relations department as part of the regular exchange with the other parts of the finance 
function. This also includes the tax department reporting the outcome of the ETR and explaining deviations from the previous year to the 
finance function. Especially, it explains any special effects to the Investor Relations department  
I provide all necessary explanations to the Investor Relations department.  
What is important 
Does it matter to you 
that the ETR is particularly low (strong decrease), 
1. that the ETR is not particularly volatile (smooth), 
2. that your ETR is similar to that of your peers’, 
3. that your ETR lies in a specific pre-determined corridor? 
 
The target rate is 25%. It is also important to us that the ETR does not fluctuate.  
A target that is "as low as possible" is not reasonable. It is far too complicated and cannot be maintained in the long term. When a tax 
issue reverses over time, i.e., in years when the ETR is temporarily high, this can show the performance of the head of taxes in a negative 
light. Thus, for these and other reasons we do not actively plan for a very low ETR. 
There is no target tax rate. Due to our business model, the tax rate is far too volatile. Deferred taxes in particular fluctuate considerably. 
The level of the ETR is less important. It should not be too low. Too high or too low a ratio we explain. An accurate and transparent 
explanation is most important. 
A stable ETR as a perspective is important to us. 
We have had a fixed target ETR range of 2% for many years. We are always within this range, almost nothing changes over time.* 
The ETR is highly dependent on the ownership structure. 
Cash-effective taxes are the focus of planning. Deferred taxes are not of interest. If the ETR is very low, however, countermeasures are 
taken.  
In the past the ETR was very important, but today cash-effective tax rates are increasingly important.  
The ETR has de facto been around 20-30% in recent years. 
Downwards deviations of the ETR occur and are ok. They need to be explained. 
We have no lower ETR threshold. There are special effects from time to time that lead to low odds. We don't manage them artificially 
upwards, but we explain such low ETR. The ETR must always be explainable and understandable for stakeholders. 
We do not have deviations from the previous year that need to be explained. The ETR is more or less constant over time. This is very 
important to both the family and management. So there is nothing special to report about the ETR.* 
When we have acquisitions, we try to flatten out all aggressive structures before closing, whether these are multi-tier holdings, hybrid 
structures, transfer prices, Luxembourg companies without substance, etc. Everything artificial is removed and should not even come into 
the company.* 
We do not orientate ourselves towards peers at all.* 
Reputation and unusual ETR  We consider an ETR unusual if it is below 23% or above 28%. 
If we could plan the ETR, we would aim for about 25-35% as a rough target. 
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Are you worried or have you experienced that a unusual 
ETR or a decreasing ETR is negatively perceived and 
thus has reputational effects? 
An ETR is unusual if it is below 25% and above 35%. Then it is necessary to explain it. 
The ETR is unusual if it falls below 20%. 
Our tax planning is designed so that we cannot come into focus.* 
Media coverage has no influence on our ETR reporting. We have never been interviewed by media about the ETR either. Experience has 
shown that anyone who is involved with our company, including journalists, quickly understands how we deal with tax issues.* 
Does this influence your approach to the way you report 
the ETR? 
 
Reputation is an issue. 
Reputation effects are very important in Germany, but also in other countries. 
Reputation is definitely seen as a topic. For us, it is important not to plan aggressively, otherwise you will quickly be in the focus of 
NGOs. This also influences CSR reporting and the climate of a tax audit. 
The ETR must be justifiable and explainable, then you don't have any reputation problems. 
Reputational risk starts at a tax rate below 25 to 30%. But that's not that dramatic, you just have to explain it.  
A good relationship with the tax auditor is essential. Therefore, tax-aggressive planning is out of the question. Tax aggressiveness impairs 
the relationship with the tax auditor.  
We explain tax issues that we expect to be ambiguous to the broader public.* 
There is a regular exchange with the Investor Relations department. I provide this department with dedicated specialist information.* 
Incentive scheme and ETR The ETR has never been part of my incentive (bonus).  
The ETR has never been part of my incentive (bonus). 
The tax rate is not part of my incentive (bonus).  
Neither the ETR itself nor its stability is part of my incentive. This has never happened.* 
Reporting channel 
How do you react in reporting terms (disclosure 
strategy)? 
1. Use of the Management Report 
2. Mention ETR early or late in the report 
3. Mention ETR as little as possible 
In order for Investor Relations to understand and communicate the many special effects incorporated in the ETR, intensive exchange takes 
place.  
Transparency and good explanations are the highest maxim and of central importance.  
The ETR is not important to us, so we keep the reconciliation as brief as possible.  
Reputation is also important for the tax audit climate. Good relations with the tax auditor and sound handling of tax audit issues are very 
important to us.  
Crowding out 
Is the ETR disclosure decision influenced by the fact that 
not all information can be mentioned on the first page 
and that some prioritization is required so that ETR 
information does not crowd out other information to be 
reported? 
There is no competition between topics. We report on the ETR as required by law and explain any special features and conditions. There 
is always room for this tax information.  
 
Notes: Topic-specific responses of five Global Heads of Taxes of major German multinationals. As defined in this paper, ETR reflects the “GAAP ETR”. In the interviews we used 
the term “GAAP ETR” to avoid confusion with unspecific kinds of ETR or cash ETR. During the interviews, the discussion occasionally turned to cash ETR which we flag up 
accordingly in the table above. Responses marked with an asterisk are from family-oriented corporations.
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2. Anecdotal Evidence from Annual Reports 
The following two examples provide anecdotal evidence on disclosure changes within firms. The first 
example is the ETR disclosure of Bayer AG from 2004 to 2008. In 2004, Bayer (already reporting under 
IFRS) has an ETR of 39.1 per cent and mentions the ETR once in the notes (M_REPORT: 0, PAGE: 
0.62). In 2005, the ETR decreases to 29.1 per cent. The ETR is now mentioned in the management report 
(Bayer 2005 annual report, p. 32).1 Hence, our variable PAGE decreases to 0.17 and M_REPORT 
changes from zero to one. In 2006, the ETR decreases again to 22.9 per cent and reappears in the 
management report (Bayer 2006 annual report, p. 54). PAGE has a value of 0.29. 2007 is special because 
Bayer has a negative ETR of -3.2 per cent and is excluded from our main sample.2 However, in 2008 
the ETR increases (compared to 2007 but also compared to 2006) to 26.9 per cent. Bayer does not 
mention the ETR in the 2008 management report. The disclosure is, as in 2004, limited to one reference 
in the notes. PAGE has a value of 0.70.  
Another example is Leoni AG. In 2006, Leoni has an ETR of 32 per cent and discloses the ETR twice: 
once in the notes and once in the management report (Leoni AG 2006 annual report, p. 38). The 
disclosure in the management report explains the reasons for the decrease from 36.9 per cent in the 
previous year to 32 per cent in 2006. PAGE is 0.38. In 2007, the ETR decreases to 26 per cent and is 
mentioned three times. In addition to the reference in the notes and the explanation of the ETR decrease 
in the management report, the ETR is mentioned a second time in the management report, referring to 
the favourable effect of the ETR on after-tax income (Leoni AG 2007 annual report, p. 37). PAGE now 
has a value of 0.32. In 2008, the ETR increases to 67 per cent and appears only (once) in the notes, with 
a PAGE value of 0.71. Interestingly, the firm mentions the high tax burden relative to pre-tax income in 
the management report but does not state the ETR directly (Leoni AG 2008 annual report, p. 58).   
  
 
1
  Page 32 in terms of the page number printed in the document and page 39 in terms of the total counted pages 
(which we record for our data). The reference in the management report reads (translated): “The ETR decreased 
to 29.1 per cent.” 
2
  Bayer does not report the ETR in its 2007 management report. The only reference to the ratio is in the notes.  
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APPENDIX B 
Figure 1: ETR Conditions and Stakeholder Specific Assessments 
Category ETR Condition Hypotheses 
Favourable ETR Condition 
from Perspective of 
Shareholder Stakeholder 
1 
Smooth 
Close to industry average 
H1a 
H1b + o 
2 Decreasing H2 + - 
3 
Volatile 
Increasing 
Above industry average 
H3a 
H3b 
H3c 
- o 
Notes: + indicates a positive assessment (benefit), o indicates an indifferent assessment, and 
- indicates a negative assessment (cost). 
 
Figure 2: Development of M_REPORT and PAGE (Unscaled and Scaled) 
Panel A  
 
Panel B 
     
Notes: Development of the yearly average disclosure visibility measures M_REPORT and PAGE over the sample 
period 2005 to 2018. PAGE (unscaled) is the variable PAGE before dividing by the total number of annual report 
pages. Both PAGE variables are presented before multiplying by -1.   
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
ETRDISCL  Alternatively, M_REPORT or PAGE 
M_REPORT Indicator variable: one if ETR information is disclosed in management report, zero 
otherwise 
PAGE Page of first ETR appearance in annual report (set to 1 if ETR is not mentioned in annual 
report), scaled by total pages, (*-1) 
ETR Condition Variables 
ETRCOND Alternatively, SMOOTH, BENCHM, DECR1, DECR2, VOLETR, INCR, or 
ABOVE_BENCHM 
SMOOTH Rolling firm specific ETR standard deviation of current and four previous years (*-1) 
BENCHM (Absolute) deviation of firm-level ETR from lagged average (one-digit SIC) industry 
ETR (*-1) 
DECR1 Indicator variable: one if ETR decreases in current relative to previous year, zero 
otherwise 
DECR2 Indicator variable: one if ETR decreases in current and previous year, zero otherwise 
VOLETR Indicator variable: one if ETR lies within the two highest deciles of the rolling five-year 
ETR standard deviation over all firms 
INCR Indicator variable: one if ETR increases in current relative to previous year, zero 
otherwise 
ABOVE_BENCHM Indicator variable: one if ETR exceeds the lagged industry mean ETR by more than ten 
per cent 
DECRLEVEL_x-y Indicator variable: one if ETR decreases in current relative to previous year and ETR of 
previous year is in the range from x (*100) to y (*100), zero otherwise 
DECRDEGREE_x-y Indicator variable: one if ETR decreases in current relative to previous year and 
percentage points of decrease are in the range from x (*100) to y (*100), zero otherwise 
Control Variables 
ETR GAAP Effective Tax Rate: total income tax expense divided by pre-tax accounting 
income 
SIZE   Natural logarithm of sales 
ROA   Pre-tax accounting income divided by lagged total assets  
AUD   Indicator variable: one if firm is audited by Big4 auditor, zero otherwise 
ARSCORE  Disclosure score of overall annual report content quality 
PPE   Gross property plant, equipment divided by lagged total assets 
R&D   Research and development expenses divided by lagged total assets  
LEV   Long-term debt divided by lagged total assets 
TREND   Yearly variable, starting with 1 in the year 2005 and ranging to 14 in 2018 
FAMILY Indicator variable: one if firm is listed on DAXplus Family 30 Index, zero otherwise 
B2C Indicator variable: one if firm has two-digit SIC code: 20 21, 22, 23 and 31, zero 
otherwise 
NEG_PTI  Indicator variable: one if pre-tax accounting income is negative, zero otherwise 
NEG_TTAX  Indicator variable: one if total income tax expense is negative, zero otherwise 
NEG_BOTH Indicator variable: one if pre-tax accounting income and total income tax expense are 
negative, zero otherwise 
 
 
Instrumental Variables 
5YEARLOSS  Count variable ranging from zero to four, representing the number of negative pre-tax 
income in the years from t-4 to t-1 
FCF  Cash flow net of capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets 
TLCF  Tax loss carryforward effect collected from the tax rate reconciliation table scaled by 
pre-tax income  
FRDIFF  Foreign tax rate differential collected from the tax rate reconciliation table scaled by 
pre-tax income 
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Table 2: Sample Selection (Sample Period 2005 – 2018) 
                Observations  Firms      
DAX30 and MDAX firms a)     1,070   80 
Non-IFRS         -21   - 
Unusual values for pre-tax income or income tax expense b)  -95   -1  
Missing data  -255   -9  
Final Sample        699   70 
Notes: This table presents the sample selection process for the sample period 2005 to 2018. The column 
‘Observations’ presents the number of firm-years, the column ‘Firms’ indicates how many distinct firms our 
sample comprises (the number of years per firm varies due to the unbalanced panel structure). a) The initial number 
of observations is <1,120 (80 firms*14 years) due to limited annual report availability in the early sample years. b) 
Excluded unusual values for pre-tax income or tax expense are the following: pre-tax income<0, tax expense<0, 
tax expense>pre-tax income. We exclude these observations from our main tests but run additional tests in which 
we explicitly test these observations in Section 6.  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Regression Variables  
 Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max N 
M_REPORT 0.78 1 0.41 0 1 699 
PAGE (unscaled) a) 
-87.83 -72 61.40 -308 -2 699 
PAGE a)   
-0.42 -0.34 0.27 -1 -0.01 699 
SMOOTH 
-0.99 -0.20 4.98 -89.46 -0.01 699 
BENCHM 
-0.08 -0.05 0.10 -0.94 -0.00 699 
DECR1 0.56 1 0.50 0 1 699 
DECR2 0.26 0 0.44 0 1 699 
VOLETR 0.14 0 0.34 0 1 699 
INCR 0.44 0 0.50 0 1 699 
ABOVE_BENCHM 0.25 0 0.43 0 1 699 
ETR 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.96 699 
SIZE 22.69 22.58 1.53 18.20 26.19 699 
ROA 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.65 699 
AUD 0.82 1 0.38 0 1 699 
ARSCORE 0.59 0.59 0.09 0.23 0.85 699 
PPE 0.63 0.56 0.39 0.00 2.21 699 
R&D 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 0.16 699 
LEV 0.20 0.18 0.15 0 1.09 699 
TREND 7.94 8 3.94 1 14 699 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables for 699 observations over the sample 
period 2005 to 2018. PAGE (unscaled) is the variable PAGE before dividing by the total number of annual 
report pages. All other variables are defined in Table 1. a) For 71 observations of our final sample, PAGE is 
missing because the ETR is not mentioned in the annual report. We replace PAGE by -1 (PAGE unscaled 
by the number of total pages of the annual report) when the ETR in not mentioned, as this is the minimum 
possible value and indicates the least intent to highlight the ETR, similar to not reporting it at all.  
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Panel B: Regression Variables Split into Decreasing and Increasing ETR Sample  
 Decreasing ETR Increasing ETR 
 Mean Median N Mean Median N 
M_REPORT 0.82 1 390 0.73* 1+ 309 
PAGE (unscaled) -82.74 -69 390 -94.25 -74 309 
PAGE  -0.40 -0.34 390 -0.45* -0.34 309 
SMOOTH -0.87 -0.17 390 -1.15 -0.23+ 309 
BENCHM -0.07 -0.05 390 -0.08 -0.05 309 
DECR2 0.47 0 390 0* 0+ 309 
VOLETR 0.11 0 390 0.17* 0+ 309 
ABOVE_BENCHM 0.15 0 390 0.38* 0+ 309 
ETR 0.26 0.27 390 0.32* 0.30+ 309 
SIZE 22.66 22.52 390 22.73 22.67 309 
ROA 0.10 0.08 390 0.08* 0.06+ 309 
AUD 0.84 1 390 0.81 1 309 
ARSCORE 0.60 0.60 390 0.59 0.58+ 309 
PPE 0.62 0.53 390 0.64 0.60 309 
R&D 0.03 0.02 390 0.02* 0.01+ 309 
LEV 0.20 0.18 390 0.20 0.18 309 
TREND 7.64 8 390 8.30* 9+ 309 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics separately for observations with decreasing and increasing 
ETR. PAGE (unscaled) is the variable PAGE before dividing by the total number of annual report pages. 
All other variables are defined in Table 1. An observation has a decreasing ETR if DECR1 is one, i.e., if 
the ETR decreases in the current compared to the previous year. An observation has an increasing ETR if 
the ETR increases in the current compared to the previous year. * indicates significance at least at the 10% 
level in a t-test, + indicates significance at least at the 10% level in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
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Table 4: ETR Conditions and Disclosure Visibility  
Panel A: Management Report  
Category  1 2 3 
  M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
M_REPORT 
(5) 
M_REPORT 
(6) 
M_REPORT 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.041**       
  (0.017)       
BENCHM +  2.924**      
   (1.361)      
DECR1 ?   0.463**     
    (0.182)     
DECR2 ?    0.561*    
     (0.293)    
VOLETR -     -1.257***   
      (0.365)   
INCR -      -0.463**  
       (0.182)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       0.046 
        (0.334) 
ETR  0.811 1.583 1.380 1.210 2.073* 1.380 0.750 
  (1.192) (1.214) (1.223) (1.226) (1.153) (1.223) (1.375) 
SIZE  -0.168 -0.156 -0.162 -0.152 -0.180 -0.162 -0.162 
  (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) (0.154) (0.156) (0.155) (0.155) 
ROA  7.937* 6.797* 7.866* 7.983* 6.853 7.866* 8.039* 
  (4.306) (4.103) (4.159) (4.159) (4.253) (4.159) (4.253) 
AUD  0.770 0.752 0.775 0.785 0.787 0.775 0.773 
  (0.704) (0.701) (0.700) (0.703) (0.745) (0.700) (0.701) 
ARSCORE  4.651** 4.881** 4.449** 4.339** 4.470** 4.449** 4.637** 
  (2.097) (2.075) (2.115) (2.090) (2.146) (2.115) (2.085) 
PPE  -1.000** -0.960** -1.017** -0.986** -0.803* -1.017** -1.030** 
  (0.481) (0.484) (0.477) (0.476) (0.488) (0.477) (0.483) 
R&D  31.823** 30.909** 31.345** 31.132** 29.670** 31.345** 32.310** 
  (14.802) (14.414) (14.606) (14.409) (15.046) (14.606) (14.824) 
LEV  -0.010 -0.012 -0.184 -0.276 0.056 -0.184 -0.102 
  (1.366) (1.407) (1.383) (1.387) (1.362) (1.383) (1.419) 
TREND  0.055 0.060 0.063 0.062 0.044 0.063 0.058 
  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) 
Constant  1.054 0.512 0.505 0.516 1.281 0.968 0.841 
  (3.870) (3.797) (3.800) (3.819) (3.885) (3.829) (3.816) 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Pseudo R²  0.184 0.190 0.185 0.185 0.205 0.185 0.178 
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7). The models are 
estimated with Logit regressions. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects (one-
digit SIC level) are included but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Panel B: Page  
Category  1 2 3 
  PAGE 
(1) 
PAGE 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.007***       
  (0.002)       
BENCHM +  0.386***      
   (0.138)      
DECR1 ?   0.038**     
    (0.019)     
DECR2 ?    0.049**    
     (0.023)    
VOLETR -     -0.176***   
      (0.039)   
INCR -      -0.038**  
       (0.019)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       0.026 
        (0.035) 
ETR  0.032 0.107 0.092 0.081 0.183 0.092 -0.021 
  (0.145) (0.143) (0.151) (0.150) (0.130) (0.151) (0.165) 
SIZE  -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
ROA  -0.012 -0.050 -0.001 -0.008 -0.060 -0.001 0.018 
  (0.256) (0.262) (0.254) (0.256) (0.257) (0.254) (0.255) 
AUD  0.071 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.074 0.070 0.071 
  (0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089) (0.089) (0.090) 
ARSCORE  0.536*** 0.556*** 0.527** 0.513** 0.539*** 0.527** 0.536*** 
  (0.197) (0.194) (0.199) (0.201) (0.191) (0.199) (0.199) 
PPE  -0.134** -0.126** -0.139** -0.135** -0.110* -0.139** -0.139** 
  (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065) 
R&D  0.781 0.769 0.754 0.737 0.676 0.754 0.866 
  (0.827) (0.833) (0.839) (0.838) (0.798) (0.839) (0.845) 
LEV  0.080 0.072 0.064 0.058 0.083 0.064 0.069 
  (0.159) (0.160) (0.162) (0.161) (0.150) (0.162) (0.165) 
TREND  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant  -0.583 -0.609 -0.646 -0.643 -0.582 -0.609 -0.611 
  (0.425) (0.419) (0.421) (0.423) (0.405) (0.426) (0.425) 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²  0.175 0.176 0.165 0.166 0.202 0.165 0.162 
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable PAGE with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7). The models are estimated 
with OLS regressions. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects (one-digit SIC 
level) are included but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5: Family Firms 
Panel A: Management Report  
Category  1 2 3 
  M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
M_REPORT 
(5) 
M_REPORT 
(6) 
M_REPORT 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.042*       
  (0.023)       
BENCHM +  2.784***      
   (1.015)      
DECR1 ?   0.487**     
    (0.214)     
DECR2 ?    0.544**    
     (0.265)    
VOLETR -     -1.186***   
      (0.278)   
INCR -      -0.487**  
       (0.214)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       0.013 
        (0.289) 
FAMILY   1.779** 2.248* 2.375 1.647* 1.687** 1.030 1.595* 
  (0.859) (1.254) (1.454) (0.861) (0.858) (0.865) (0.871) 
SMOOTH*FAMILY  0.017       
  (0.047)       
BENCHM*FAMILY   17.644      
   (18.157)      
DECR1*FAMILY    -1.345     
    (1.670)     
DECR2*FAMILY     -0.489    
     (1.679)    
VOLETR*FAMILY      -1.370   
      (1.860)   
INCR*FAMILY       1.345  
       (1.670)  
ABOVE_BENCHM*FAMILY        -0.237 
        (1.714) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7), including an indicator for family-run 
firms and interactions with the ETRCOND variables. All control variables from the main model (including industry-fixed effects) are included but not reported. The models are estimated 
with Logit regressions. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Panel B: Page 
Category  1 2 3 
  PAGE 
(1) 
PAGE 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.007***       
  (0.002)       
BENCHM +  0.393***      
   (0.141)      
DECR1 ?   0.044**     
    (0.021)     
DECR2 ?    0.060**    
     (0.027)    
VOLETR -     -0.177***   
      (0.040)   
INCR -      -0.044**  
       (0.021)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       0.022 
        (0.038) 
FAMILY  0.049 0.022 0.084* 0.076 0.048 0.033 0.043 
  (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.049) (0.048) (0.052) (0.051) 
SMOOTH*FAMILY  -0.006***       
  (0.002)       
BENCHM*FAMILY   -0.691      
   (0.506)      
DECR1*FAMILY    -0.052*     
    (0.027)     
DECR2*FAMILY     -0.078**    
     (0.035)    
VOLETR*FAMILY      0.130**   
      (0.058)   
INCR*FAMILY       0.052*  
       (0.027)  
ABOVE_BENCHM*FAMILY        0.085 
        (0.061) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²  0.177 0.177 0.166 0.168 0.203 0.166 0.164 
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable PAGE with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7), including an indicator for family-
run firms and interactions with the ETRCOND variables. All control variables from the main model (including industry-fixed effects) are included but not reported. The models 
are estimated with OLS regressions. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6: ETR Decrease Level and Degree 
Panel A: Level of Previous Year ETR 
 M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
PAGE 
(8) 
DECRLEVEL_75-100 0.511    -0.133    
 (0.893)    (0.103)    
DECRLEVEL_50-75  -0.191    -0.096   
  (0.445)    (0.059)   
DECRLEVEL_25-50   0.564**    0.057***  
   (0.247)    (0.020)  
DECRLEVEL_0-25    -0.118    -0.028 
    (0.321)    (0.032) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²     0.162 0.164 0.171 0.162 
Pseudo R² 0.177 0.177 0.186 0.177     
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT (Logit regressions) in columns (1) to (4) and the dependent variable PAGE (OLS 
regressions) in columns (5) to (8). The DECRLEVEL variables are variations of DECR1, taking the value one if the ETR decreases in the current relative to the previous 
year and the ETR of the previous year is in the range included in the variable name, zero otherwise. All control variables from the main model (including industry-fixed 
effects) are included but not reported. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
Panel B: Degree of ETR Decrease 
 M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
PAGE 
(8) 
DECRDEGREE_0-5 0.635***    0.035*    
 (0.225)    (0.018)    
DECRDEGREE_5-10  0.057    0.022   
  (0.316)    (0.032)   
DECRDEGREE_10-20   0.228    0.052  
   (0.381)    (0.046)  
DECRDEGREE_>20    -0.837*    -0.119** 
    (0.481)    (0.050) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²     0.164 0.161 0.163 0.167 
Pseudo R² 0.187 0.177 0.178 0.181     
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT (Logit regressions) in columns (1) to (4) and the dependent variable PAGE (OLS 
regressions) in columns (5) to (8). The DECRDEGREE variables are variations of DECR1, taking the value one if the ETR decreases in the current relative to the previous 
year and the percentage points of the decrease are in the range included in the variable name, zero otherwise. All control variables from the main model (including industry-
fixed effects) are included but not reported. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table OA1: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 7) 8) 9) 10) 11) 12) 
1) M_REPORT 1.000            
2)PAGE -0.703 1.000           
3)SMOOTH 0.395 -0.280 1.000          
4)BENCHM 0.202 0.133 0.394 1.000         
5)DECR1 0.114 0.055 0.129 0.009 1.000        
6)DECR2 0.119 0.082 0.134 -0.008 0.530 1.000       
7)VOL -0.271 -0.235 -0.531 -0.228 -0.088 -0.086 1.000      
8)INCR -0.114 -0.055 -0.129 -0.009 -1.000 -0.530 0.088 1.000     
9)ABOVE_BENCHM -0.014 0.051 -0.060 -0.345 -0.257 -0.171 0.172 0.257 1.000    
10)ETR 0.088 0.091 0.069 0.141 -0.245 -0.199 0.193 0.245 0.645 1.000   
11)SIZE -0.092 0.047 -0.112 -0.095 -0.026 -0.074 0.010 0.026 0.045 -0.004 1.000  
12)ROA 0.276 0.086 0.426 0.292 0.143 0.120 -0.223 -0.143 -0.149 -0.050 -0.278 1.000 
13)AUD 0.180 0.171 0.132 0.107 0.039 -0.013 -0.076 -0.039 -0.026 -0.015 0.089 0.072 
14)ARSCORE 0.054 0.112 -0.084 -0.078 0.066 0.075 0.019 -0.066 0.071 0.042 0.268 -0.066 
15)PPE -0.216 -0.253 -0.292 -0.148 -0.046 -0.102 0.164 0.046 -0.055 -0.119 -0.035 -0.029 
16)R&D 0.308 0.146 0.219 0.200 0.099 0.105 -0.150 -0.099 -0.076 0.081 0.011 0.282 
17)LEV -0.109 -0.017 -0.145 -0.162 -0.010 0.007 0.098 0.010 0.071 -0.058 0.068 -0.220 
18)TREND 0.023 0.051 0.185 0.043 -0.079 -0.083 -0.109 0.079 -0.009 -0.174 0.006 -0.047 
 
 
13) 14) 15) 16) 17) 18) 
13)AUD 1.000 
  
 
  
14)ARSCORE 0.039 1.000     
15)PPE -0.133 0.013 1.000    
16)R&D 0.104 -0.028 -0.068 1.000   
17)LEV -0.072 0.106 0.173 -0.325 1.000  
18)TREND 0.015 -0.187 -0.021 -0.077 0.001 1.000 
Notes: This table presents spearman correlations for disclosure visibility variables, ETR condition variables, and control variables. All variables are defined in Table 1. Figures in 
bold and italics indicate significance at 5% level.  
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Table OA2: Consumer-Oriented Firm Tests 
Panel A: Management Report  
Category  1 2 3 
  M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
M_REPORT 
(5) 
M_REPORT 
(6) 
SMOOTH + 0.034      
  (0.021)      
BENCHM +  3.074***     
   (1.056)     
DECR1 ?   0.478**    
    (0.214)    
DECR2 ?    0.576**   
     (0.264)   
INCR -     -0.478**  
      (0.214)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -      0.002 
       (0.290) 
B2C  2.867* 1.544 1.744* 2.121** 2.424* 2.036** 
  (1.653) (1.443) (0.908) (0.875) (1.472) (0.877) 
SMOOTH *B2C  1.954      
  (2.480)      
BENCHM *B2C   -4.580     
   (13.088)     
DECR1*B2C    0.680    
    (1.722)    
DECR2*B2C     -0.973   
     (1.800)   
INCR*B2C      -0.680  
      (1.722)  
ABOVE_BENCHM *B2C       -0.711 
       (1.778) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 
Pseudo R²  . . . . . . 
Notes: This table presents logit regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (6), including an 
indicator for consumer-oriented firms (B2C) and interactions with the ETRCOND variables. It does not include estimations for the ETR condition VOLETR because 
the model cannot be estimated with the interaction with B2C due to collinearity. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. 
Controls and industry-fixed effects (one-digit SIC level) are included but not reported. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, 
in two-tailed tests. 
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Panel B: Page 
Category  1 2 3 
  PAGE 
(1) 
PAGE 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
SMOOTH + 0.006***      
  (0.002)      
BENCHM +  0.398***     
   (0.136)     
DECR1 ?   0.042**    
    (0.020)    
DECR2 ?    0.060**   
     (0.024)   
INCR -     -0.042**  
      (0.020)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -      0.027 
       (0.035) 
B2C  0.146 0.130 0.163** 0.179** 0.153* 0.149* 
  (0.091) (0.096) (0.062) (0.069) (0.081) (0.075) 
SMOOTH *B2C  -0.004      
  (0.131)      
BENCHM *B2C   -0.452     
   (0.741)     
DECR1*B2C    -0.010    
    (0.040)    
DECR2*B2C     -0.093*   
     (0.054)   
INCR*B2C      0.010  
      (0.040)  
ABOVE_BENCHM *B2C       0.031 
       (0.054) 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²  0.189 0.191 0.181 0.184 0.181 0.177 
Notes: This table presents OLS regression results for the dependent variable PAGE with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (6), 
including an indicator for consumer-oriented firms (B2C) and interactions with the ETRCOND variables. It does not include estimations for the ETR 
condition VOLETR because the model cannot be estimated with the interaction with B2C due to collinearity. All variables are defined in Table 1. 
Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. Controls and industry-fixed effects (one-digit SIC level) are included but not reported. ***, **, and 
* indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table OA3: Unusual ETR Conditions 
 M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
DECR1 0.405**  0.035*  
 (0.179)  (0.018)  
DECR2  0.525*  0.043** 
  (0.279)  (0.021) 
NEG_PTI 0.487 0.620 -0.038 0.003 
 (1.092) (0.784) (0.148) (0.119) 
NEG_TTAX -2.763*** -3.134*** -0.219*** -0.286*** 
 (0.901) (0.770) (0.065) (0.057) 
NEG_BOTH 1.925 1.954 0.101 0.090 
 (1.675) (1.298) (0.172) (0.141) 
DECR1*NEG_PTI -1.101  -0.099  
 (0.805)  (0.102)  
DECR1*NEG_TTAX -0.374  -0.046  
 (0.960)  (0.085)  
DECR1*NEG_BOTH -0.094  0.005  
 (1.867)  (0.159)  
DECR2*NEG_PTI  -2.058***  -0.242** 
  (0.783)  (0.113) 
DECR2*NEG_TTAX  -0.022  0.083 
  (2.080)  (0.110) 
DECR2*NEG_BOTH  -1.014  0.003 
  (2.543)  (0.210) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 794 794 794 794 
Adj. R²   0.202 0.208 
Pseudo R² 0.218 0.224   
Notes: This table presents regression results for the dependent variable M_REPORT (Logit 
regressions) in columns (1) to (2) and the dependent variable PAGE (OLS regressions) in 
columns (3) to (4). The variables NEG_PTI, NEG_TTAX, and NEG_BOTH indicate unusual 
conditions for the numerator and/or denominator of the ETR. All control variables from the 
main model (including industry-fixed effects) are included but not reported. All variables 
are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm are presented in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table OA4: 2SLS 
Panel A: First Stage 
 ETR 
(1) 
SMOOTH 
(2) 
BENCHM 
(3) 
DECR1 
(4) 
DECR2 
(5) 
VOLETR 
(6) 
INCR 
(7) 
ABOVE_BENCHM 
(8) 
5YEARLOSS 0.002 -1.719*** -0.018** -0.082*** -0.076*** 0.150*** 0.082*** 0.019 
 (0.011) (0.628) (0.009) (0.032) (0.019) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) 
FCF 0.260** -1.079 0.030 -0.687 -0.742* 0.629** 0.687 0.253 
 (0.112) (2.391) (0.094) (0.439) (0.434) (0.310) (0.439) (0.427) 
TLCF 0.235*** 2.337* 0.051 -0.250 -0.144 0.136 0.250 0.349* 
 (0.089) (1.412) (0.066) (0.273) (0.168) (0.146) (0.273) (0.193) 
FRDIFF 0.071 -2.189 0.011 -0.129 -0.069 -0.255 0.129 0.468 
 (0.081) (2.464) (0.069) (0.326) (0.358) (0.300) (0.326) (0.299) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R² 0.104 0.036 0.183 0.024 0.046 0.181 0.024 0.041 
Shea’s partial R² 0.054 0.042 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.078 0.010 0.004 
Notes: This table presents results from the first stage regression of an instrumental variable estimation explained in Section 7. Columns (1) to (8) present results for regressing 
the eight endogenous variables ETR, SMOOTH, BENCHM, DECR1, DECR2, VOLETR, INCR, and ABOVE_BENCHM on the four instruments 5YEARLOSS, FCF, TLCF, 
FRDIFF, and the control variables from the main model (except for ETR). 5YEARLOSS is a count variable ranging from zero to four, representing the number of negative pre-
tax income in the years from t-4 to t-1. FCF is cash flow net of capital expenditures scaled by lagged total assets. TLCF is the tax loss carryforward effect collected from the 
tax rate reconciliation table scaled by pre-tax income. FRDIFF is the foreign tax rate differential collected from the tax rate reconciliation table scaled by pre-tax income. All 
variables are defined in Table 1. Robust Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed 
tests. Shea’s partial R² measures the correlation between the endogenous variable and the instruments after partialling out the effect of the control variables. 
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Panel B: Second Stage M_REPORT  
Category  1 2 3 
  M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
M_REPORT 
(5) 
M_REPORT 
(6) 
M_REPORT 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.058**       
  (0.026)       
BENCHM +  5.176**      
   (2.505)      
DECR1 ?   1.161**     
    (0.553)     
DECR2 ?    1.113**    
     (0.482)    
VOLETR -     -0.548***   
      (0.203)   
INCR -      -1.161**  
       (0.553)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       -2.208 
        (1.362) 
ETR  0.319 -0.328 2.268* 1.812* 1.107 2.268* 3.908 
  (0.863) (1.099) (1.214) (0.978) (1.032) (1.214) (2.396) 
SIZE  -0.035*** -0.038** -0.026 -0.011 -0.033** -0.026 -0.043 
  (0.013) (0.017) (0.020) (0.019) (0.013) (0.020) (0.030) 
ROA  0.240 -0.710 0.076 0.070 0.294 0.076 -0.266 
  (0.275) (0.654) (0.450) (0.438) (0.308) (0.450) (0.712) 
AUD  0.110** 0.042 0.091 0.151** 0.128** 0.091 0.103 
  (0.055) (0.081) (0.076) (0.072) (0.056) (0.076) (0.100) 
ARSCORE  0.574*** 0.869*** 0.226 0.003 0.596*** 0.226 0.848* 
  (0.181) (0.260) (0.335) (0.343) (0.180) (0.335) (0.434) 
PPE  -0.098* 0.049 -0.133** -0.038 -0.054 -0.133** -0.205** 
  (0.056) (0.106) (0.064) (0.076) (0.052) (0.064) (0.102) 
R&D  1.792** 1.721** 0.107 0.178 1.637*** 0.107 -1.644 
  (0.784) (0.799) (1.470) (1.281) (0.614) (1.470) (2.635) 
LEV  0.153 0.078 -0.084 -0.183 0.098 -0.084 -0.038 
  (0.132) (0.151) (0.182) (0.206) (0.109) (0.182) (0.250) 
TREND  0.005 0.007 0.022** 0.019*** 0.005 0.022** 0.014 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Notes: This table presents results from the second stage regression of an instrumental variable estimation explained in Section 7 for the dependent variable M_REPORT with the instrumented ETR 
and ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Panel C: Second Stage PAGE  
Category  1 2 3 
  PAGE 
(1) 
PAGE 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.055**       
  (0.022)       
BENCHM +  4.827**      
   (2.362)      
DECR1 ?   1.089**     
    (0.460)     
DECR2 ?    1.046***    
     (0.375)    
VOLETR -     -0.506***   
      (0.150)   
INCR -      -1.089**  
       (0.460)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       -2.147* 
        (1.273) 
ETR  -0.161 -0.764 1.667* 1.242* 0.570 1.667* 3.322 
  (0.620) (1.161) (0.933) (0.724) (0.729) (0.933) (2.243) 
SIZE  -0.017* -0.019 -0.008 0.005 -0.014* -0.008 -0.025 
  (0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) (0.008) (0.017) (0.029) 
ROA  -0.229 -1.113* -0.383 -0.389 -0.175 -0.383 -0.730 
  (0.189) (0.627) (0.368) (0.345) (0.207) (0.368) (0.687) 
AUD  0.066* 0.002 0.048 0.104* 0.083** 0.048 0.059 
  (0.040) (0.072) (0.063) (0.057) (0.039) (0.063) (0.092) 
ARSCORE  0.518*** 0.793*** 0.191 -0.018 0.538*** 0.191 0.784* 
  (0.132) (0.230) (0.290) (0.282) (0.126) (0.290) (0.425) 
PPE  -0.095** 0.042 -0.128** -0.038 -0.055 -0.128** -0.197** 
  (0.046) (0.097) (0.056) (0.063) (0.039) (0.056) (0.095) 
R&D  0.526 0.463 -1.054 -0.991 0.389 -1.054 -2.825 
  (0.625) (0.703) (1.303) (1.110) (0.426) (1.303) (2.488) 
LEV  0.165 0.095 -0.058 -0.151 0.112 -0.058 -0.017 
  (0.102) (0.129) (0.155) (0.171) (0.075) (0.155) (0.227) 
TREND  0.001 0.002 0.016** 0.013** 0.000 0.016** 0.009 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008) (0.009) 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Notes: This table presents results from the second stage regression of an instrumental variable estimation explained in Section 7 for the dependent variable PAGE with the instrumented ETR and 
ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7). All variables are defined in Table 1. Robust Standard errors are presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table OA5:  Fixed-Effect Estimation 
Panel A: Management Report  
Category  1 2 3 
  M_REPORT 
(1) 
M_REPORT 
(2) 
M_REPORT 
(3) 
M_REPORT 
(4) 
M_REPORT 
(5) 
M_REPORT 
(6) 
M_REPORT 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.145       
  (0.125)       
BENCHM +  1.843      
   (1.607)      
DECR1 ?   -0.011     
    (0.441)     
DECR2 ?    -0.233    
     (0.558)    
VOLETR -     -3.435***   
      (1.280)   
INCR -      0.011  
       (0.441)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       -0.451 
        (0.677) 
ETR  -4.303* -4.452** -4.331* -4.553* -1.992 -4.331* -3.312 
  (2.197) (2.130) (2.568) (2.432) (2.325) (2.568) (2.745) 
SIZE  3.530* 3.358* 3.567* 3.610* 3.815* 3.567* 3.517* 
  (1.981) (2.006) (2.021) (2.044) (2.187) (2.021) (2.013) 
ROA  -1.124 -1.598 -1.268 -1.398 -1.603 -1.268 -1.118 
  (4.707) (4.613) (4.879) (4.845) (4.644) (4.879) (4.844) 
ARSCORE  3.956 4.368 4.269 4.265 4.072 4.269 4.371 
  (4.343) (4.091) (4.102) (4.166) (4.983) (4.102) (4.190) 
PPE  3.538 2.869 3.007 2.894 5.252 3.007 2.967 
  (3.191) (2.896) (2.924) (2.890) (3.428) (2.924) (2.959) 
R&D  55.623 66.101 63.989 69.063 35.106 63.989 67.377 
  (51.045) (50.286) (51.138) (52.876) (53.262) (51.138) (51.289) 
LEV  -4.331 -3.650 -3.993 -3.837 -7.215* -3.993 -4.186 
  (3.927) (3.695) (3.680) (3.609) (3.990) (3.680) (3.851) 
N  293 293 293 293 293 293 293 
Pseudo R²  0.383 0.379 0.377 0.378 0.443 0.377 0.379 
Notes: This table presents results from a logit firm- and year-fixed effects estimation for the dependent variable M_REPORT with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to (7). 
All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Panel B: Page 
Category  1 2 3 
  PAGE 
(1) 
PAGE 
(2) 
PAGE 
(3) 
PAGE 
(4) 
PAGE 
(5) 
PAGE 
(6) 
PAGE 
(7) 
SMOOTH + 0.003**       
  (0.001)       
BENCHM +  0.034      
   (0.063)      
DECR1 ?   -0.006     
    (0.014)     
DECR2 ?    0.002    
     (0.021)    
VOLETR -     -0.120***   
      (0.040)   
INCR -      0.006  
       (0.014)  
ABOVE_BENCHM -       0.002 
        (0.031) 
ETR  -0.111 -0.104 -0.121 -0.108 -0.042 -0.121 -0.115 
  (0.104) (0.107) (0.115) (0.110) (0.089) (0.115) (0.127) 
SIZE  0.000 -0.000 0.003 0.002 -0.021 0.003 0.002 
  (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.075) (0.071) (0.075) (0.075) 
ROA  -0.127 -0.121 -0.111 -0.112 -0.224 -0.111 -0.112 
  (0.199) (0.202) (0.199) (0.200) (0.194) (0.199) (0.203) 
ARSCORE  0.013 0.037 0.035 0.034 0.021 0.035 0.034 
  (0.144) (0.144) (0.145) (0.144) (0.138) (0.145) (0.144) 
PPE  -0.085 -0.088 -0.090 -0.088 -0.046 -0.090 -0.088 
  (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.095) (0.095) 
R&D  2.956*** 3.075*** 3.089*** 3.053*** 2.890*** 3.089*** 3.061*** 
  (1.114) (1.113) (1.127) (1.124) (1.056) (1.127) (1.117) 
LEV  -0.078 -0.080 -0.080 -0.085 -0.099 -0.080 -0.083 
  (0.109) (0.115) (0.117) (0.118) (0.110) (0.117) (0.117) 
N  699 699 699 699 699 699 699 
Adj. R²  0.593 0.590 0.590 0.590 0.606 0.590 0.590 
Notes: This table presents results from a firm- and year-fixed effects estimation for the dependent variable PAGE with the different ETRCOND variables in columns (1) to 
(7). All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors clustered by firm in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, in two-
tailed tests. 
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